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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
This "appeal" of a decision of the Third District Court 
was originally filed with the Utah Supreme Court, which has 
exercised its discretion to "pour over" the case to the Utah 
Court of Appeals, which thus has jurisdiction in accordance 
with Section 78A-4-103(j), Utah Code. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This appeal (and the predicate factual situation 
surrounding it) presents the following issues for review: 
1. The trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment because the material facts were in 
genuine dispute and the Defendants were not 
entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of 
law. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In accordance with Rule 56, 
motions for summary judgment are appropriate only 
in situations where the material facts are not in 
genuine dispute and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. See also Kouris vs 
Utah Highway Patrol, 2003 UT 19, 70 P.3d J2 (Utah 
Supreme Court 2003); Hill vs Allred, 2001 UT 16, 
28 P.3d 1271 (Utah Supreme Court 2001) i on 
subsequent appeal 2009 UT 28, 216 P.3d 929 (Utah 
Supreme Court 2009). The appellate review is for 
"correctness". IHC Health Services, Inc. vs D & K 
Management, Inc., 2008 UT 73, 196 P.3d 588 (Utah 
. . 
Supreme Court 2008); Overstock.com, Inc. vs 
5 
SmartBargains, Inc., 2008 UT 55, 192 P. 3d 858 
(Utah Supreme Court 2008). The appellate court 
affords no deference to the lower court's legal 
conclusions. Christensen & Jensen, P.C. vs Barrett 
& Daines, 2008 UT 64, 194 P.3d 931 (Utah Supreme 
Court 2008); Pearce vs Utah Athletic Foundation, 
2008 UT 13, 179 P.3d 760 (Utah Supreme Court 
2008) Factual inferences and the evidence are 
viewed in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment. Lucky Seven Rodeo 
Corporation vs Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah Court of 
Appeals 1988); Western Water, LLC vs Olds, 2008 UT 
18, 184 P.3d 578 (Utah Supreme Court 2008). If the 
appellate court concludes that a genuine issue of 
material fact exists, the appellate court must 
reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand 
for triai on that issue. Bowler vs Deseret Village 
Association, Inc., 922 P.2d 8 (Utah Supreme Court 
1996); English vs Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154 (Utah 
Court of Appeals 1989), affirmed 848 P.2d 153. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL. The issues 
pertinent to the "summary judgment"---including 
the genuine issues of material fact and/or the 
principles of law which would have precluded 
judgment in favor of the Defendants on their 
motion-~-were-presented to the District Court in 
Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO 
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DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [RECORD at 
406--442], as well as within the AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID 
K GILLETT SUBMITTED IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [RECORD at 443-451], 
as well as the "Motion for New Trial" materials. 
RECORD at 606-614] 
2. The trial court, correctly concluding the 
"fraudulent concealment doctrine" extended ( to 
2002) the· commencement of the running of the 
applicable statute of limitations, nevertheless 
erred in applying the 3-year statute of limitation 
(for fraud) rather than the 6-year statute (for 
obligations based-upon written documents), which 
the Plaintiffs' clearly-pleaded "breach of 
contract" against both Defendants, including but 
not limited to the pleaded "violation of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing", claims 
were. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. See cases cited in Point I, 
above. See also Russell Packard Development, Inc. 
vs Carson, 2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d 741 (Utah Supreme 
Court 2005). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL. This issue- - -
that the statute of limitation for claims against 
Brown was tolled, pursuant to Section 78B-2-104, 
Utah Code---was identified, presented to the 
District Court, and thus preserved . for appeal 
7 
within the Plaintiffs' "motion for new trial 11 , · 
together with the supplemental materials related 
thereto: · Plaintiffs' Rule 59 (b) motion for new 
trial and Rule 60(b) motion to set aside judgment 
and/or grant relief [RECORD at 606-608], 
Plaintiff's memorandum of law in support of Rule 
59(b) and Rule 60(b) motions [RECORD at 609-611], 
and Affidavit of David K Gillett in support of 
motion for new trial [RECORD at 612-614], and 
Plaintiffs' reply memorandum in support of motion 
for new trial, etc. [RECORD at 926-933]. The 
District . Court's resolution of these issues is 
found generally at Pages 6 through 9 of the 
Court's "RULING" document, entered 24 June 2014. 
[RECORD at 946 through 956] 
3. The trial court erred in failing to take into 
account and apply the provisions of Section 78B-2-
104 [effect of absence from state] (and its 
predecessor provisions) against Defendant BOYD J 
BROWN, so as to II toll" the II running" of the 
statute of limitation against him, by reason of 
that continuous absence, as per sworn testimony 
before the Court and for which no rebuttal thereto 
was offered or identified. The tolling provisions 
of 78B-2-104 are effective and controlling (by 
reason of the defendant's absence from the state), 
regardless.of whether the plaintiffs were aware of 
8 
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his out-of-state location. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. Where the issue involves 
interpretation and application of a statute, the 
appellate ~ourt grants the trial court no 
deference but reviews the conclusion for 
correctness; Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy 
Clinic·, Inc. vs Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1995); Young El~ctric Sign Company, 
Inc. vs State ex rel UDOT, 2005 UT App 169, 110 
P.3d 1118 (Utah Court of Appeals 2005). Also see 
Point I, above. Whether the statute of limitations 
has run is a legal conclusion to be reviewed for 
correctness. Tolman vs Logan City, 2007 UT App 
260, 167 P.3d 489 (Utah Court of Appeals 2007). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL. This issue---
statute of limitation for claims against Brown was 
tolled, pursuant to Section 78B-2-104, Utah Code--
-was identified, presented to the District Court, 
and thus preserved for appeal within the 
Plaintiffs' "motion for new trial", together with 
the supplemental materials related thereto: 
Plaintiffs' Rule 59(b) motion for new trial and 
Rule 60(b) motion to set aside judgment and/or 
grant relief [RECORD at 606-608], Plaintiff's 
memorandum of law in support of Rule 59(b) and 
Rule 60(b) motions [RECORD at 609-611], and 
Affidavit of David K Gillett in support of motion 
9 
for new trial [RECORD at 612-614], and Plaintiffs' 
reply memorandum in support of motion for new 
trial, etc. [RECORD at 92 6-933] . The District 
Court's resolution of these issues is found 
generally at Pages 6 through 9 of the Court's 
"RULING" document, entered 24 June 2014. [RECORD 
at 946 through 956] 
4. A contracting party's "fraudulent concealment" 
of its own "breach of contract" should extend the 
time a corporate entity to bring such claims 
pursuant to Section 16-l0a-1405, Utah Code, which 
"winding up" statute has no stated period of 
limitations. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. See cased cited in Point I, 
above. On this point there was---except for 
GILLETT's statement made as described in the 
"preservation" subparagraph, below ·[RECORD at 
444 J - - -absolutely no "factual evidence" before the 
District Court, to warrant "summary judgment" 
barring the claims. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL: The "winding up" 
issue was factually identified in Paragraph 2 of 
the SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K GILLETT. 
[RECORD at 444] No other "evidence" was presented 
to the District Court, which issued its more 
extensive decision· in the "RULING" document 
[RECORD at 948] disposing of the "new trial" and 
10 
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) 
the "set aside" motions. 
5. The "first breach" doctrine (of. "contract 
law") has no application and/or should not be 
rigidly applied---particularly in a "summary 
judgment" situation wherein the material facts may 
be in genuine dispute---to excuse the non-
defaulting party from (1) the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing under the contract and 
(2) the specific contractual performance and 
events·· specifically contemplated by th~ parties·.· 
for such commercial default situations. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. See "summary judgment" 
cases cited in Point I, above. See also Saunders 
vs Sharp, 840 P.2d 796 (Utah Court of Appeals 
1992) [whether a breach is material is reviewed 
independently by appellate court] 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE ON APPEAL. In its June 
2014 "RULING" document [RECORD at 948-949], the 
District Court sua sponte raised the "first·· 
breach" doctrine as a basis upon which to bar 
Plaintiffs' claims. As the RULING---purporting to 
resolve Plaintiffs' "new trial" and related 
motions- - -was essentially "final" [ see final 
written paragraph of RULING: RECORD at 955], 
Plaintiffs had no opportunity to present any 
response the~eto. 
11 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are helpful and necessary in 
deciding this appeal: 
Point III 
78B-2-104 Effect of absence from state. 
If a cause of action against a person while the 
person is out of the state, the action may be 
commenced within the term as limited by this 
chapter after his return to the state. If after a 
cause of action accrues the person departs from 
the state, the time of his absence is not part of 
the time limited for the commencement of the 
action. 
Emphasis.added. [Similar provisions were formerly 
(pre-2008) contained in Section 78-12-35, repealed 
and replaced in the 2008 legislative 
recodification of Title 78.] 
Point IV 
Section 16-l0a-1405, Utah Code [adopted in 1992 
and not subsequently amended through 2008]: 
16-l0a-1405 Effect of Dissolution 
(1) A dissolved corporation continues its 
corporate existence but may not carry on any 
business-except that appropriate to wind up and 
liquidate its business and affairs, including: 
(a). collecting its assets; 
(2) Dissolution of a corporation does not: 
(a) transfer title to the corporation's property; 
. 
(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding 
by or against the corporation in its 
corporate name; 
Emphasis added. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves claims against a commercial lender 
[SENTRY FINANCIAL] and a "personal guarantor" [BOYD BROWN] 
for ''breach of contract 11 ( including violation of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing) associated with 
their active misrepresentations concerning the status of the 
commercial loan and foreclosure proceedings thereunder. A 
separate "fraud" claim is made against BROWN. 
Ruling on narrow "statute of limitation'' issues, the 
District Court held the Plaintiffs' claims were barred. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This case is on appeal following the District Court's 
granting of II summary judgment 11 , essentially ruling on 
"statute.of limitation" grounds to bar Plaintiffs' claims. 
Consequently, the operative "facts" and events were not 
"found" or determined by the District Court. 
For the Court of Appeals' generalized understanding, 
the following "facts 11 , claims and events are ref erred to in 
the RECORD, as noted. 
A 
COMMERCIAL HISTORY 
The .11commercial history" of this case is specifically 
described within the AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K GILLETT IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
[hereinafter "AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K GILLETT"] , dated as of 23 
August 2012, RECORD at 216-238, with attachments at RECORD 
239-263. 
13 
In April 19 94 SENTRY FINANCIAL CORPORATION [hereinafter 
11 SENTRY 11 ] loaned to MAJESTIC AIRLINES the sum of 
approximately $483,102.43, repayable in monthly installments 
of approximately $16,000 over a 36-month period. [AFFIDAVIT 
OF DAVID K GILLETT, Paragraph 5.] RECORD at 217. 
MAJESTIC's repayment of the SENTRY loan was secured by 
security interests in four cargo aircraft (the. 11 Beech·99 s 11 ) 
and four fuel trucks. MAJESTIC's repayment of the SENTRY 
loan was personally guaranteed by DAVID K GILLETT, a natural 
person, and BOYD J BROWN, a natural person. [AFFIDAVIT OF 
DAVID K GILLETT, Paragraph 6.] RECORD at 218. 
In March 1995 MAJESTIC AIRLINES, having made monthly 
payments of approximately $60,000, was in arrears in the 
repayment of the SENTRY loan. [AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K GILLETT, 
Paragraph 7.] RECORD at 218. 
On or about 17 March 1995 SENTRY, through its 
authorized corporate personal, made demand upon BOYD J BROWN 
for a payment, pursuant to his 11 personal guarantee 11 of the 
MAJESTIC AIRLINES' repayment of the SENTRY loan---of 
approximately $249,964.88. [AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K GILLETT, 
Paragraph 8.] RECORD at 218. 
On or about 17 March 1995 BOYD J BROWN made---pursuant 
to his 11 personal guarantee II of the MAJESTIC AIRLINES 
repayment of the SENTRY loan- - -payment to SENTRY of the 
$249,964.88, as requested by SENTRY. [AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K 
GILLETT, Paragraph 9.J· RECORD at 218. 
At times material hereto SENTRY did not disclose---to 
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MAJ;ESTIC AIRLINES or co-guarantor DAVID K GILLETT- - -BROWN' s 
March 1995 payment of the $249,964.88, said payment (by 
BROWN) having been made pursuant to the "Guarantee and 
Waiver" document executed pursuant to the loan documents 
signed by the parties thereto. [AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K 
GILLETT, Paragraph 10.] RECORD at 218. 
At times material hereto, SENTRY continued to 
affirmatively and actively assert and claim that MAJESTIC 
AIRLINES (and, implicitly, DAVID K GILLETT, pursuant to the 
"personal guarantee") owed the full amount of the loan 
(approximately $450,000, plus interest accruing after April 
1995. '[AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K GILLETT, Paragraph 11.] RECORD 
at 218-219. JONATHAN RUGA DEPOSITION, P. 62-63. 
SENTRY'S Complaint (in the 1995 litigation, to 
judicially collect the then-outstanding indebtedness) did 
not reflect or identify the BROWN "pay-down" payment, but 
referred to specific amounts alleged to be owing by 
MAJESTIC. [AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K GILLETT, Paragraph 12.] 
RECORD at 219. 
The "DEFAULT JUDGMENT", prepared by SENTRY' s legal 
counsel (Attorney Stephen Hale, in 1995) and submitted to 
Judge Wilkinson of the Third District Court for signature 
and subsequent entry, asserting MAJESTIC' s delinquency to be 
$450,119.70 did not reflect the BROWN "pay-down" payment of 
almost $250,000: that is, the $450,119.70 amount did not 
include or acknowledge BROWN' s "pay-down" payment. 
[AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K GILLETT, Paragraph 13.] RECORD at 219. 
15 
SENTRY did not disclose to MAJESTIC or GILLETT the BOYD 
BROWN "pay-down" payment (actually made and received in 
March 1995) until the deposition of Jonathan M Ruga in March 
2002. [AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K GILLETT, Paragraph 14.] RECORD 
at 219. 
The 17 March 1995 BROWN "pay-down" payment of the 
$249,964 to SENTRY effectively reduced the then outstanding 
balance owed to SENTRY (claimed by SENTRY in the April 1995 
SE~TRY-prepared "judgment" to be approximately $450,000) 
owed by MAJESTIC AIRLINES to be approximately $200,000. 
[AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K GILLETT, Paragraph 15.] RECORD at 219. 
BROWN' s "pay-down" payment of approximately $250,000 to 
SENTRY in March 1995 had the effect of correspondingly 
reducing the interest which would accrue to the outstanding 
delinquency. [AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K GILLETT, Paragraph 16.] 
RECORD at 219. 
Had the BROWN "pay-down" payment of $249,964 to SENTRY 
be~n disclosed to MAJESTIC AIRLINES and/ or to DAVID .. K 
GILLETT, MAJESTIC and/or GILLETT could have and would have 
done things differently (there would have been no "auction", 
and so forth), including but not limited to the liquidation, 
in a commercially reasonable manner (which would include 
worldwide advertising of the Beech 99 aircraft "for sale", 
with the opportunity for "flight testing" ·and so forth), 
which would have garnered a price commensurate with the 
actual fair market value of the aircraft (approximately 
$500,000), thus e~abling MAJESTIC to fully pay off the 
16 
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SENTRY LOAN, including accrued interest. [AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID 
K GILLETT, Paragraph 17.] RECORD at 219-220. 
B 
"JUDICIAL HISTORY" 
In 2003 Plaintiffs filed an action in Third District 
Court, but the action was dismissed without prejudice, 
without formal adjudication on-the-merits. See David K 
Gillett et al vs Boyd J Brown et al, Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, Civil No. 030919800. Case 
filed 5 September 2003; dismissed 14 June 2006. --See 
ATTACHMENT 3 of the ADDENDA to this brief. 
In 2007 the case was re-filed, pursuant to the 11 savings 
statute" [78-12-40]. Majestic Airlines, Inc. et al vs SFC 
Air Corp I et al, Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, Civil No. 070409723. Case filed 13 June 
2007; dismissed 23 October 2007. The 2007-filed case was 
dismissed in October 2007, because the Defendants were not 
served within the requisite time period following filing. 
COMPLAINT, -~ 11; RECORD at 3. See ATTACHMENT 4 of. the 
ADDENDA to this brief. 
The present action was filed within the one-year 
prescribed by the 11 saving statute" [Section 78B-2-111, Utah 
Code (since 2008), and its predecessor Section 78-12-40]. 
COMPLAINT, ~ 11. RECORD at 3. 
In August 2 012 the Plaintiffs moved for "partial 
summary judgment II on the question of II contractual 
liability": Defendants openly admitted the BROWN 11 paydown 
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payment II was kept secret and not disclosed. [ In fact, SENTRY 
even asserted the "paydown payment" had no effect upon 
MAJESTIC' s obligation to repay the loan. Such a "legal" 
result is vigorously contested. See Point II, herein.] 
PAGE 17, 9" SENTRY and BROWN responded thereto with a 
"full" summary judgment motion, on essentially "statute of 
limitation" grounds. RECORD at 264. On 16 December 2013 the 
District Court heard the oral arguments and orally ruled in 
favor of Defendants, who failed---even after opposing 
counsel's written invitation [see RECORD at 605] to do so---
to timely submit the written 11 judgment 11 • 
On 15 March 2014---the 11 judgment 11 still not having been 
prepared---the Plaintiffs filed Rule 59(b) motion for new 
trial and Rule 6 O (b) "motion to set aside" the un-f iled 
"judgment". RECORD at 606-608. Plaintiffs also filed on 15 
March 2014 "show cause 11 pleadings for the as-yet-unfiled 
proposed "judgment". [RECORD at 617-621] Defendants finally 
turned in the written "judgment", which was signed entered 
by the District Court on or about 13 April 2014. RECORD at 
913-915. ATTACHMENT #1 of ADDENDA to this brief. 
District Court- - - in response to Plaintiffs' 11 new trial 11 
and "set aside 11 motions, issued its "Ruling" in June 2014. 
[See RECORD at p. 946-956; ATTACHMENT #2 of the ADDENDA to 
this brief.] The detailed "Ruling" document more 
definitively expresses the District Court's analysis and 
conclusions- - -both of which are incorrect- - -and should be so 
scrutinized. 
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THE "SUMMARY JUDGMENT" MOTIONS 
In August 2012 the Plaintiffs moved the Court for 
partial summary judgment ( on the issue of contractual 
liability only: SENTRY 1 s intentional concealment of the 
paydown payment constituted a breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing). Plaintiffs simultaneously 
filed the AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K GILLETT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. RECORD at 216-220, with 
attachments at RECORD 221-263. 
In October 2 012 Defendants filed their "counter-motion" 
for summary judgment, on the basis that the Plaintiffs' 
claims were barred by applicable statutes of limitation. 
[RECORD at 264-265] The Plaintiffs responded that the 
running of the statutes of limitation was tolled, by reason 
of the "concealment" undertaken by the Defendants. [RECORD 
at 406-451]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. The "genuine dispute of material facts" precludes the 
granting of summary judgment. The appellate court, if it 
concludes that the material facts are "in genuine dispute", 
must reverse the District Court's decision and remand for 
jury trial. As more specifically shown in the discussion and 
argument made . in Points I I through V, herein, 1fma terial 
facts" were generally in "genuine dispute" which should have 
precluded the granting of summary judgment. 
2. The Plaintiffs' claims were expressly pleaded as 
19 
"breach of contract" against both Defendants, for which a 
six-year statute of limitation would be applicable under 
Section 78B-2-309, Utah Code. The Defendants' "fraudulent 
concealment II extended the commencement of the running of the 
statute. The District Court erred by deeming the claims to 
be II for fraud", for which the District Court applied a 
shorter (3-year) statute of limitation to bar the 
Plaintiff's claims. The District Court's decision, applying 
a shorter statute of limitation applicable to claims the 
Plaintiffs did not make or plead improperly deprived the 
Plaintiffs of their "day in court". 
3. Although a "fraud" claim was expressly pleaded against 
Defendant BROWN, the District Court erred in applying a 
three-year statute of limitation to ba~ the Plaintiffs' 
claims. At all times material hereto, Defendant BROWN was a 
resident of Teton County, Wyoming; the "sworn statement" of 
Plaintiff GILLETT to that effect was unrebutted by BROWN. 
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 78B-2-104 [ "Effect of 
Absence from State"], Utah Code, the applicable statutes of 
limitations for Plaintiffs' claims- - -for both the "breach of 
contract" and the "fraud" allegations---would have never 
11 run". The District Court's decision to overlook the "sworn 
testimony" on this issue results in injustice to Plaintiffs. 
4. The District Court erred in its rulings (1) that the 
MAJESTIC AIRLINES claims were not filed in accordance with 
its "winding up" activities and (2) that the MAJESTIC 
AIRLINES claims were transferred to its sole shareholder, 
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DAVID K GILLETT. There were no II facts II or evidence presented 
on these rulings, which contradict the applicable statutes 
as well as the sworn testimony of Mr GILLETT. While such.a 
ruling might be appropriate after a trial (which might be a 
"jury issue" in this case), a fact-based ruling at summary 
judgment stage is inappropriate and erroneous. 
5. The District Court's sua sponte raising the II first 
breach" doctrine- - -as a basis to adjudicate the case by 
barring Plaintiffs' claims---was without any factual basis 
(i.e. sworn evidence) or documentary support. The Court---
not having the relevant documents---was in no position to 
assess the opercition of 40+ pages of complex commerc_ial 
documents, involving three additional parties. The ''first 
breach" doctrine is inapplicable to this complex situation 
in which the claimed "default" in repayment did not 
necessarily result in a rescission of the contractual 
relationship or remedies. That the District Court made its 
unsolicited conclusions in a II summary judgment II context ( ala 
resolution of "new trial II motion) and without actually 
hearing the case at trial compounds the problem. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BECAUSE THE MATERIAL FACTS WERE IN GENUINE DISPUTE 
AND THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW 
As noted in Points II through V, below, the "material 
facts 11 - - -up_on which the District Court had to rely in 
effecting the "summary judgment 11 rulings for "statute of 
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limitation" and other issues---were 11 in genuine dispute", 
thus preventing summary judgment. See cases identified in 
".Issues Presented for Appeal", above. 
These "material facts" in dispute include: 
1. BOYD BROWN'S continuous (since mid-1990s) 
residence out~of-state, as asserted by Plaintiffs 
[RECORD at 612-614: AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K GILLETT 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, ~~ 3-5] and as 
acknowledged by Defendants. See Point III, below. 
2. The claims of MAJESTIC AIRLINES were pursuant 
to the "winding up" of its corporate affairs. 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K GILLETT, ~ 2 
[RECORD at 444]. 
3. MAJESTIC AIRLINES' default in making the 
monthly repayments does not necessarily constitute 
a "breach", so as to abrogate under the "first 
breach" doctrine, the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing and the extensive 
contractual provisions, consisting of almost 40 
pages of text divided among 12 distinct documents, 
of which only but 2·documents (circa 7 pages) were 
before the Court. See Point V, below. 
II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN (1) MISCHARACTERIZING 
·THE PLAINTIFFS'·CLEARLY-PLEADED "BREACH OF CONTRACT" . 
CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS SENTRY AND BROWN AND 
(2) APPLYING A SHORTER STATUTE OF LIMITATION 
(FOR "FRAUD") TO_BAR LITIGATION OF THOSE CLAIMS 
Defendants' fundamental argument for "summary judgment" 
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in their favor was a "statute of limitation" defense: that 
the Plaintiffs' claims were barred by the provisions of the 
three-year statute of limitation found in Section 78-12-
26(3) [and/or its successor provision (since 2008): Section 
78B-2-305 (3) "for fraud"]. [RECORD at 271-397. The sheer 
volume (100+ pages) of the Defendant,.s memorandum and 
supporting materials itself almost conf1rms the 
inappropriateness of the "summary judgment" motion.] 
Plaintiffs. responded that the claims were not so barred, 
because a "six year" statute (provided for by Section 78-12-
23 [obligation founded upon an instrument in writing] was 
applicable, and that the commencement of that statute was 
"tolled" pursuant to the "equitable discovery" doctrine 
articulated in Russell Packard Development, Inc. vs Carson, 
2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d 741 (Utah Supreme Court 2005) 
[hereinafter "Packard Development"] 
Even the claims against SENTRY, even if for fraud, are 
preserved. 
At the outset it must be noted that, in the opinion of 
the undersigned, the District Court was confused and 
inconsistent. Although the Court's announced ruling 
[December 2013] and the written one-page "Judgment" 
resulting therefrom [ATTACHMENT 1; RECORD at 913-915] 
seemingly accepted the Plaintiffs' "equitable discovery" 
arguments and the "extension" (undersigned's term) of the 
commencement of the statute of limitation, the 11-page 
~'RULING" document [ATTACHMENT 2; RECORD at 946-956] seems 
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confused and misapplies- - -noticeably in an "arithmetic" 
fashion---the operative principles. 
In Packard Development the Utah Supreme Court took the 
opportunity to clarify the law concerning situations wherein 
the regular statute of limitation might be extended. The 
Utah Supreme Court identified two situations and wrote: 
The first setting in which the discovery 
rule applies is the most obvious and involves 
situations in which a relevant statute of 
limitation, by its own terms, mandates application 
of the discovery rule. . . . An example of a 
statutory discovery rule is found in the three-
year statute of limitations governing claims based 
on fraud or mistake, 
2005 UT 14 at~ 21, 108 P.3d at 746. Citation to cases 
omitted. 
Concerning the "second" situation---the so-called 
"equitable discovery rule" - - -the Utah Supreme Court in 
Packard Development wrote: 
We have limited the circumstances in which an 
equitable discovery rule may operate to toll an 
otherwise fixed statute of limitations period to 
the following two situations: (1) "where a 
plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of 
action because of the defendant's conceal or 
misleading conduct," and (2) "where the case 
presents exceptional circumstances and the 
application of the general rule would be 
irrational or injust, regardless of any showing 
that the defendant has prevented the discovery of 
the cause of action." Walker Drug, 902 P. 2d at 
1231 (internal quotation omitted); see also Myers, 
635 P.2d at 86 .... However, we now clarify and 
emphasize that these equitable exceptions apply 
only where a statute of limitations does not, by 
its own terms, already account for such 
circumstances---i.e., where a statute of 
limitation lacks a statutory discovery rule. 
2005 UT 14 at·~ 25, 108 P.2d at 741. Emphasis added. 
It is undisputed that SENTRY failed to disclose that 
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payment made to SENTRY. ,SENTRY---intentionally concealing 
the Brown "paydown payment"---continued to assert that 
MAJESTIC AIRLINES still owed the fuli amount of the unpaid 
loan balance. 
SENTRY was unabashedly direct in acknowledging SENTRY' s 
failure to inform MAJESTIC and DAVID K GILLETT of the BROWN 
"pay-down" payment. Mr Jonathan M Ruga, Chief Executive 
Officer ["CEO"] of SENTRY, testified in his September 2011 
deposition: 
Answer (by Mr RUGA): The intent was that, as I-
stated at the outset and a couple of times during 
this deposition. Sentry would not have made the 
loan to Dave and his companies but for Boyd's 
agreement to absolutely and unconditionally 
guarantee full payment of all amounts owed by Dave 
and his companies. 
Question (by Mr Homer): Then· I'm still 
troubled, and I' 11 renew my question. Why then. 
would Sentry say, "Well, we don't have to tell 
Boyd" -- excuse me. Tell Dave Gillett or Majestic 
that Boyd had made that substantial payment? Why 
would Sentry persist and say, ·"Well, we won't tell 
Boyd"? Excuse me "We won't tell David"? 
A: Well, there was no reason to tell David. Dave 
still owed the money. 
Q: Why did David owe the money if that payment is 
being made by his co-guarantor? 
A: Let me ask this, Steve. Did Dave make the payment? 
Q (by Homer): No, David didn't make the 
payment, but the payment was made. 
A (by Ruga); Did Dave make the payment? No. Did 
Dave still owe the money? Yes. 
DEPOSITION OF JONATHAN RUGA, 16- September 2011, page 
lines 4-25 to page 56, line 1. Emphasis added. 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, p. 18. RECORD at 190. 
55, 
See 
FOR 
Mr Ruga' s self- serving- - -but nevertheless incorrect 
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understanding- - -of the "guarantee" principle is additionally 
illuminated by his testimony immediately thereafter: 
Q (by Horner): Did he owe the money to Sentry?. 
Because that money has been paid by his partner, 
if you will. 
A (by Mr Ruga): No. It wasn't paid on behalf --
no, no. You are completely rnischaracterizing what 
the position of a guarantor is in this context. 
Boyd was not his partner. Boyd was a guarantor, an 
independent party. The fact that an independent 
party with a guarantee makes a payment does not 
relieve the obliger from making the payment. 
Period. 
DEPOSITION OF JONATHAN RUGA, 16 September 2011, page 56, 
lines 2-12. Emphasis added.FOOTNOTE1 See PLAINTIFFS' 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, p. 19. RECORD at 191. 
SENTRY'S non-disclosure of BROWN'S $250,000 payment---
reflected in documentation obtained (2010) from the 
Defendants in this- litigation pursuant to ~re-trial 
discovery requests---was acknowledged by SENTRY Chief 
Executive Officer Jonathan Ruga in his deposition testimony. 
Mr Ruga stated: 
Answer (by Mr Ruga): ... Now, that's all 
conjecture. I think the point I'd like to make is: 
Sentry had no obligation to communicate the Boyd 
pay-down · to Dave because Dave still owed the 
money. End of discussion. 
DEPOSITION OF JONATHAN RUGA, 16 September 2011, page 63, 
lines 22-25. Emphasis added. See PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF 
1 Opposing counsel's usage of the term "partner" in the 
question posed to Mr Ruga [SENTRY CEO], with the 
corresponding voice inflection and the phrasing 11 if you 
will", was undertaken not to evidence "partner" status in 
the classic sense of that word. The "partner" 
characterization was to indicate that BROWN, in his 
"guarantor" status, was on the MAJESTIC "side of things": 
MAJESTIC and BROWN both had contractual obligations to pay 
SENTRY. 
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LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, p. 
19. RECORD at 191. 
The District Court, correctly concluding the 
irfraudulent conCealment doctrine" extended (to 2002) the 
commencement of the running of the applicable statute of 
limitations, nevertheless erred in applying the 3 -year 
statute of limitation (for fraud) rather than the 6-year 
statute (for obligations based upon written documents), 
which the Plaintiffs' clearly,--pleaded "breach of contract" 
against both Defendants, including but not limited to the 
pleaded "violation of implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing", claims were. 
Initially [December 2013] the District Court seemingly 
correctly applied the "fraudulent concealment" doctrine 
(from Packard Development, supra) so as to extend---until 
2002---the commencement of the running of the statute of 
limitation. But the District Court's subsequent selection 
and application of the 3-year "statute" to bar the claims if 
filed after 2005 is in error. 
The Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendants SENTRY 
FINANCIAL and BROWN are embodied within the Complaint, which 
contains distinctly-pleaded claims against each defertdant 
separately. The claims---carefully pleaded and utilizing 
legal theories and principles precisely selected and 
intended by Plaintiffs and their counsel to identify (and to 
"provide notice" to the Defendants)---arise from the 
Defendant's "breach" of contractual obligations embodied 
within the several written documents, generally prepared by 
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SENTRY FINANCIAL but actually signed by all parties 
(Plaintiffs MAJESTIC AIRLINES and GILLETT, Defendants SENTRY 
and BOYD J BROWN) [the so-called "Loan Documents" and other 
writings]. 
The District Court's announced ruling seemingly jumbles 
the Plaintiffs' carefully-crafted and precisely-pleaded 
claims and combines those distinct claims into a single 
judicial "pigeonhole", thus disregarding the uniqueness of 
each claim. The Court's ruling seemingly takes the 11 fra1,1c;l 11 
claim pleaded against Defendant BROWN [THIRD CAUSE OF 
ACTION] , incorrectly applies that "fraud 11 claim as though 
the fraud claim had been pleaded against SENTRY---which 
claim had not been so pleaded against SENTRY---and then 
applies the 3-year statute of limitation to bar the actual 
claim [SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: breach of contract by SENTRY 
entities] precisely pleaded against SENTRY. Likewise, the 
Court's ruling seemingly merges the Plaintiffs' claims for 
"breach of contract" claim made against BROWN [FIRST CAUSE 
OF ACTION] into the "fraud" claim uniquely pleaded against 
him [THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION] 
The District Court's ruling improperly mutates and 
converts the Plaintiffs' carefully-pleaded "breach of 
contract" claims against SENTRY FINANCIAL CORPORATION into 
"fraud" claims-, - -something never intended by the Plaintiffs 
or their counsel- - -and then the Court applies the "shorter" 
(ala 3-year) statute of limitation applicable for 11 fraud" 
claims. 
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Plaintiffs' 11 liability" claims against Defendant SENTRY 
are embodied within the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, clearly 
denominated as 11 breach of contract 11 , are thus: 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
[breach of contract by SENTRY entities] 
49. The allegations of Paragraphs 1 through 41, 
inclusively, of the Complaint are incorporated 
herein as though set forth in their entirety. 
50. SENTRY and SFC AIRCRAFT breached contract 
( loan documents and security interest documents by 
failing to disclose- - -at least until the March 
2002 depositions of corporate officials in other 
litigation---to Plaintiffs the July 1995 payment 
of the $250,000 by BOYD J BROWN in July 1995 and 
by continuing to coerce the II auction" in 
satisfaction thereof, such that DAVID K GILLETT 
and MAJESTIC AIRLINES effectively lost its 
equipment and aircraft and the business 
opportunities and profits to be derived therefrom. 
COMPLAINT, ~ 49-50, RECORD at 9-10. Emphasis added. 
The 11 SENTRY . . breached contract 11 text placed the 
SENTRY entities "on notice 11 as to the 11 breach of contract 11 
nature of the claims made against them. The Court's ruling- -
- converting those . claims · into something which was never 
intended (i.e. 11 fraud 11 ) , and thereafter applying the shorter 
statute of limitation (i.e. 3-years, for 11 fraud")---
contradicts and offends the justice in the situation. The 
Plaintiffs' claims should be approached and adjudicated on 
the basis of what was actually pleaded, not on the basis of 
what those claims may actually appear to be similar to. 
While- - -in simplistic analysis- - -all II fraud" is likely 
to be a 11 breach of contract 11 , all 11 breach of contract" 
situations do not necessarily rise to the level of II fraud 11 • 
Fraud, a tort, consists of at least nine elements, the 
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factual basis of which must be plead "with particularity". 
"Fraud"---as a tort---is legally distinct from a "contract" 
action; fraud has additional elements. 
Plaintiffs' pleaded "breach of contract" claims based 
upon violations of the "implied covenant of good faith and 
f a•ir dealing"· are not, ipso facto, "converted" into "fraud" 
claims, even for statute of limitations purposes. The case 
(and the claims) remain one of "breach of contract", which 
has been so pleaded and for which the "breach of contract" 
statute of limitation [6 years, under 78B-2-309] applies. 
It is patently unfair and improper for the District 
Court to contort and convert Plaintiffs' precisely-pleaded 
"breach of contract" claims into something they were never 
intended to be. The Plaintiffs are entitled to have their 
claims actually tried on the basis- - -i.e. "breach of 
contract 11 - - -which they have selected and pleaded. The Court 
erred in applying the "fraud" statute of limitation, so as 
to bar claims which were never intended and never pleaded 
and simultaneously bar "breach of contract" claims entitled 
to the "longer" statute. 
Plaintiffs'. separate and distinct claims against 
Defendant BOYD J BROWN are embodied within the FIRST CAUSE 
OF ACTION [breach of contract] and the THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
[f-raud] of Plaintiffs' complaint. [That Plaintiffs have 
specifically pleaded "fraud" against BROWN- - -but NOT against 
the SENTRY entities---additionally militates against the 
Court's improper "conversion II of the Plaintiffs' "breach of 
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contract" claims against the SENTRY entities into the 
"fraud" claim having the shorter statute of limitation.] 
IF the Plaintiffs had intended-. - -they didn't so intend-
- -to have pleaded a "fraud" claim against the SENTRY 
entities, they could have and would have done so, much_ l_ike 
the "fraud" claim pleaded against Defendant BOYD J BROWN. 
The Plaintiffs' claims are based upon the.writ ten "loan 
documents", thus being entitled to the six-year statute of 
limitation of Section 78B-2-309] Utah Code [liability based 
upon instrument in writing] 
The 2007-refiled case, being filed in June 2007, was 
within six years of when the Defendants---within the March 
2002 deposition of. Sentry corporate president Jonathan Ruga-
--first disclosed the March 1995 BOYD BROWN "paydown 
payment", which had effectively and intentionally 
"concealed" from GILLETT's and MAJESTIC's awareness by the 
Defendants for years. 
The Plaintiffs' claims are preserved pursuant to the 
"saving statute" found in the Section 78B-2-111, Utah Code 
[recodified 2008], which provides in relevant part: 
78B-2-111 Failure of action -- Right to commence new 
action 
(1) If any action is timely filed and the judgment 
for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff 
fails in the action otherwise than upon the 
merits, and the time limited either by law or 
contract for commencing the action has expired, 
the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of 
action survives,. his representatives, may commence 
a new action within one year after the reversal or 
failure. 
The limitation presently found in subsection (b) thereof is 
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not applicable; the restriction did not exists prior to 
2007. The 2008-filed litigation is the first-and-only time 
the restriction would come into play. 
The 11 implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 11 
is in addition to the parties' actual agreement, as created 
by and described within their written agreement. The 
"implied covenant 11 is just that: it is implied and imposed 
upon the parties, regardless of what they might have said or 
otherwise not said. The implied covenant is necessary for 
the fundamental, underlying integrity of the contracting 
process and enforcement thereof. In Utah, virtually every 
. . . . 
contract imposes upon each party an implied duty of good 
faith and fair dealing. Oakwood Village LLC vs Albertsons, 
Inc., 2004 UT 101, 104 P.3d 1226 (Utah 2004); Prince vs Bear 
River Mutual Insurance Company, 56 P.3d 524, 2002 UT 68 
(Utah 2002). 
Under the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, the parties constructively promise that they would 
not intentionally do anything to impair other party's right 
to receive fruits of contract. Cook vs Zions First National 
Bank, 919 P.2d 56, cert denied. 925 P.2d 963 (Utah App 1996); 
Rawson vs Conover, 2001 UT 24, 20 P.3d 876 (Utah 2001); 
Malibu Investment Company vs Sparks, 2000 UT 30, 996 P.2d 
1043 (Utah 2000); St. Benedict's Development Co. vs St. 
Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1985). 
The violation of the implied duty -of good faith and 
fair dealing gives rise to a claim for breach of contract. 
32 
C 
( 
C 
C 
C 
C 
( 
( 
( 
C 
( 
-.-
J 
J 
Oakwood Village, supra; Prince vs Bear River Mutual, supra; 
fDQ Lube Center, Inc. vs Huber, .949 P.2d 792 (Utah App 
1997). 
Within and against the foregoing principles of law 
concerning contract interpretation (really not a significant 
issue in this case) and contract enforcement (the "core" 
issue in this case), the following facts are material and 
pertinent: 
1. SENTRY didn't disclose BROWN 1 s 11 pay-down 11 
payment. 
2. SENTRY persisted in thereafter fraudulently. 
manipulating things (litigation and 11 default 
judgment 11 , 11 title 11 transfer, "auction'' 
arrangements, 11 accounting" denied and proceeds 
improperly sequestered, 11 buy-back 11 permitted but 
not thereaft~r honored, and so forth). 
Fundamentally, the obligation of 11 co-guarantor 11 BOYD 
BROWN to make a payment---any payment, in any amount---
against and/ or within the repayment of the MAJESTIC AIRLINES 
loan (from .. SENTRY) , together with the FACT of such · a 
payment, was within the intention of the parties. It was 
reflected within the written contractual documents the 
parties signed with each other and which were relied upon by 
the parties. In that context, the fact that BOYD BROWN might 
make part of the payments (for MAJESTIC) was as binding 
(upon him and upon SENTRY, as recipient of that payment) as 
was MAJESTIC's obligations to effect repayment under the 
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terms of its Promissory Note. Each of the related 
contractual obligations were of equal force and 
enforceability. Correspondingly, SENTRY (in its role as 
recipient of the payments) to give greater priority to 
payments received from one party over payments made by 
another party. Likewise, SENTRY should not be allowed to 
collusively make a "side deal" with one of the parties, in 
or_der to fraudulent acquire more than was actually agreed to 
in the first instance. 
It is undisputed that BOYD BROWN, who had previously 
"personally guaranteed" repayment of the MAJESTIC AIRLINES 
loan, paid to SENTRY FINANCIAL the sum of $249,964.00 in 
mid-March 1995. 
The BROWN payment had the effect of reducing the then-
outstanding indebtedness of MAJESTIC (circa $450,000, per 
the Complaint filed two weeks later: 30 March 1995) by the 
amount of the payment. This SIMPLISTIC arithmetic is: 
MAJESTIC indebtedness (per SFC Air) 
Less: BROWN payment [17 March 95] 
MAJESTIC arrearage after payment 
$450,000 
250,000 
$200,000 
Notwithstanding the payment which reduced the underlying 
obligation to SENTRY, SENTRY persisted in its fraudulent and 
deceptive claims that MAJESTIC continued to be liable for 
the $450,000 amount, plus accruing interest thereto. 
On 17 March 1995 Mr Jonathan Ruga, as President of 
SENTRY FINANCIAL CORPORATION, wrote the following letter to 
BOYD J BROWN (who had, in consideration of $20,000 paid to 
him by MAJESTIC AIRLINES, "personally guaranteed" repayment 
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of the MAJESTIC loan) 
Mr. Boyd J. Brown 
4243 Abinadi 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
Jonathan M. Ruga 
March 17, 1995 
Rei $483,102.43 Loan ("Loan") from Sentry Financial Corporation 
("Sentry") to Majestic Airlines, Inc. ("Majestic") 
Dear Boyd: 
As we have discussed, the Loan is in default because of Maj es tic's 
failure to make the require payments. Pursuant to your Guarantee and 
Waiv'er dated as of April 29, 1994 ("Guarantee"), Sentry has the right to 
require you to repay the Loan to Sentry together with all interest and 
other amounts owed to Sentry in connection with the Loan. 
This letter confirms that Sentry has agreed to forebear from 
immediately foreclosing on the collateral securing the Loan ("Sentry 
Collateral") and demanding immediate repayment of the Loan from you 
pursuant to the Guarantee in consideration of: 
1. Your making a payment to Sentry in the amount of 
$249,964.88 ("Brown Paydown") on or before Friday, March 
17, 1995; 
2. Your working with Sentry to foreclose upon (a) 
Sentry's collateral, and (b) the collateral for other loans 
made by you to Majestic ("Brown Collateral"), and 
3. Your causing Majestic to transfer all of its 
remaining assets to SFC Aircraft Corp. I (or such other 
entity as Sentry determines). 
Sentry.agrees that the Brown Paydown shall commensurately reduce 
your liability to Sentry under the Guarantee. In addition, Sentry shall 
divide all futurei payments made by Majestic to Sentry in respect of the 
Loan as follows: (i) first, to reimburse Sentry for all of its out-of-
pocket expenses incurred by Sentry in connection with the Loan, the 
Sentry Collateral and the Brown Collateral, and (ii) the balance shall 
be divided one-half to you and one-half to Sentry. 
This letter shall also confirm that, notwithstanding (i) the Brown 
Paydown, (ii) the terms of this letter, and (iii) any other action taken 
by Sentry prior to or after the date hereof, the Brown Guarantee shall 
remain in full force and effect and has not been modified or abridges in 
any manner or to any extent. 
If this accurately sets forth our agreement, please sign below 
where indicated. 
Sincerely, 
Jonathan M. Ruga 
Chief Executive Officer 
Agreed to and accepted as of 
this ___ day of March, 1995. 
BOYD J BROWN 
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Emphasis added. [RECORD at 214] 
The collusive---even 11 conspiratorial 11 ---nature and 
result arising from the Ruga letter is facially evident from 
its own terms: 
1. Subparagraph (1), by Brown's agreement to 
"work with Sentry" (Ruga terminology) to foreclose 
upon Sentry's collateral as well as Brown's 
11 collateral 11 • FOOTNOTE 2 
2. Brown's II causing" Maj es tic to transfer other 
assets---more than the identified collateral---
over to Sentry's subsidiary entity (SFC Air Corp 
I) , which had been shortly before created (by 
Sentry) to facilitate the foreclosure and the 
litigation. Pursuant to the "loan documents", 
repayment of the SENTRY loan to MAJESTIC was 
limited to a specified amount, plus accruing 
interest, and was II secured" by the identified 
pledged collateral; SENTRY had no right to expect 
2 Mr Ruga's otherwise-unexplained reference to the 
"Brown collateral" apparently has reference to other 
unrelated loans made by BROWN to MAJESTIC, for which certain 
DC-3 aircraft (then in Alaska) were claimed to have been 
pledged as collateral. The repayment of those loans was not 
in "default" and no "foreclosure" against the collateral 
would have been justified. 
When several years later BOYD BROWN filed an action to 
attempt to foreclose against the claimed encumbrances 
against the aircraft, he promptly dismissed his pleaded 
claims against defendant David K Gillett when he (Gillett) 
asserted the documents filed with the FAA to create the 
encumbrances were forgeries. The unrelated third-parties as 
defendants in that litigation prevailed against BOYD BROWN 
following a two-day bench trial before Judge Bohling of the 
Third District Court. 
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excessive payment to be collusively 11 split 11 with 
BROWN, as proceeds from additional items placed 
into the "auction". 
The collusive, conspiratorial result is further evidenced by 
SENTRY'S (i.e. Ruga's) suggestion that any excess monies 
received by SENTRY (ostensibly over and above what the loan 
documents provided for) would be II split II between Sentry and 
Brown: one-half of any excess to each of the. two co-
conspirators. [This raises the rhetorical question: In the 
repayment of this commercial loan, how can the Lender (i.e. 
SENTRY) expect more to be paid (by MAJESTIC) that what the 
writ ten contract documents identify and provide? J This 
proposal, which was seemingly accepted by Brown because the 
two parties acted---for two years thereafter---in a manner 
consistent with the conspiratorial letter, had the effect of 
creating and making BOYD BROWN into a 11 double agent" as in 
a spy movie: whereas before BROWN was, theoretically, on 
MAJESTIC' s II side 11 (pursuant to the "personal guarantee 11 ) , 
the SENTRY proposal set things up so that BROWN was dealing 
on his own account and making a profit at the expense of the 
party (MAJESTIC) he had agreed to help, and he was 
c;::ompensated for ;his "guarantee" agreement.FOOTNOTE3 
3 BROWN's "personal guarantee" of the repayment of the 
MAJESTIC loan made by SENTRY speaks for itself, in 
accordance with the "four corners" of the written documents 
creating and describing that obligation. Whether BROWN was 
to be repaid (by MAJESTIC) for such "guarantee" payments 
made by him is irrelevant to this litigation. 
It should be pointed out that BROWN has never filed any 
claims or litigation against MAJESTIC AIRLINES for his 
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Mr Ruga's incorrect understanding of the "guarantee" 
principle is additionally illuminated by his testimony 
immediately thereafter: 
Q (by Homer): Did he.owe the money to Sentry? 
Because that money has been paid by his partner, 
if you will. 
A (by Mr Ruga): No. It wasn't paid on behalf --
no, no. You are completely mischaracterizing what 
the position of a guarantor is in this context. 
Boyd was not his partner. Boyd was a guarantor, an 
independent party. The fact that an independent 
party with a guarantee makes a payment does not 
relieve the obliger from making the payment. 
Period. 
DE-POSITION OF JONATHAN RUGA, 16 September 2011, page 56, 
lines 2-12. Emphasis added. See PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF 
LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, p. 
19. RECORD at 191. 
SENTRY' s self-serving, self-justifying (to fraudulently 
keep more than it was entitled to) position (as per its CEO 
Jonathan Ruga) that the BROWN "pay-down" payment essentially 
had no effect upon the underlying indebtedness stands 
commercial practices on their head. The position become 
almost ludicrous. The whole idea of having a "guarantor" was 
to have that'additional ass~rance that the Lender (SENTRY) 
would be repaid. The Borrower (MAJESTIC) reasonably relied 
upon those provisions. BROWN'S "pay-down" payment had the 
effect of reducing the corresponding indebtedness (of 
MAJESTIC) by that amount. 
To assert- - -as SENTRY seemingly does- - -that SENTRY 
"Brown Paydown" payment. This failure to make such a claim 
ostensibly arises from the fact that BROWN was paid by 
SENTRY pursuant to the "collusive", conspiratorial agreement 
those two parties made between themselves. 
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could continue to claim that MAJESTIC still owed the full 
amount is not only counter-intuitive to logic, common sense 
and regular commercial understanding and practice, the 
position is not supported by the parties' written 
agreements. There is not one single word, not even one 
single syllable of written text which reasonably supports 
the assumption that a payment by a co-guarantor would not 
inure to the benefit of the Borrower (MAJESTIC) . To assert, 
as SENTRY does, that SENTRY is allowed to continue to claim 
the Borrower is still fully liable makes no sense 
whatsoever; the parties- - -at least the parties on the 
"Borrower's side of things 11 ---could not have possibly ever 
understood or intended such a result. Not only is there NO 
TEXT supporting those assertions (by SENTRY), the actual 
provisions of the loan documents lead precisely to the 
opposite conclusion. 
Subparagraph (h) of the "Guarantee and Waiver" 
document, signed by SENTRY and by BROWN, peripherally 
iddresses this sltuation, by providing in relevant pait: 
. The Guarantor shall have no right. of 
subrogation against the Obliger or any security 
held for any Liabilities of the Obligor until 
Sentry shall have been paid in full all 
Liabilities of the Obligor, in which case Sentry 
will assign and subrogate all of its right, title 
and interest in and to the Loan Documents. 
RECORD at 244. Emphasis added. The BROWN "Guarantee" 
document was placed II in evidence II pursuant to the AFFIDAVIT 
OF DAVID K GILLETT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. See RECORD at 243-245. 
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The quoted provision utilizes the "passive voice" (i.e. 
"SENTRY paid in full").· The phrase does not specifically 
require payment must be made by MAJESTIC, as the borrower. 
Similarly, the whole concept of "subrogation" being 
involved- - - and SENTRY committed in writing "to subroga te 11 - - -
implies that another party (i.e. a "guarantor") will be 
making the payment·~ Indeed, the express language concerning 
the "subrogation" is to the effect that "Sentry will assign 
and subrogate all its right, title and interest in and to 
the Loan Documents" over to the Guarantor (presumptively 
BROWN) , thus confirming the principle that "payment in full" 
to SENTRY extinguishes the Borrower's (MAJESTIC' s) liability 
to SENTRY.FOOTNOTE 4 
Mr Ruga's 17 March 1995 letter to BOYD BROWN---see 
previous discussion at pp. 34-36 of this BRIEF---states: 
"Sentry agrees that the Brown Paydown shall 
commensurately reduce your liability to Sentry 
under the Guarantee." 
Of course BROWN 1 s liability would. be correspondingly 
reduced. Bui, likewise, SENTRY'S expectations and rights 
vis-a-vis MAJESTIC AIRLINES would be correspondingly 
reduced. It is absurd to think---as SENTRY suggest~---that 
a guarantor would make a payment and that the original 
obligor (MAJESTIC AIRLINES) and the paying guarantor would 
not have their obligations correspondingly reduced. The fact 
4While the foregoing II subrogation" text identifies and 
creates corresponding rights in BROWN (ostensibly by reason 
of his "paydown" payment and to the extent thereof), those 
11 rights II extending to and existing in BROWN are not at issue 
in this case. 
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that Mr Ruga's own characterization of BROWN'S anticipated 
payment· to be a "pay-down" is itself significant, to a 
result which SENTRY cannot now disclaim or deny or contrive 
some disingenuous interpretation. 
SENTRY'S collusion with co-guarantor BOYD BROWN, first 
suggested by Jonathan Ruga, Chief Executive Officer of 
SENTRY in the letter to BROWN, was further confirmed by Mr 
Ruga in his deposition: 
Answer (by Mr Ruga) We demanded payment 
pursuant to the guarantee. He made a payment. Now, 
that doesn' t suggest that there can' t be an 
additional agreement between the guarantor and the 
lender with respect to which the guarantor is 
entitled to participate in the proceeds of the 
loan. 
DEPOSITION OF JONATHAN RUGA, 16 September 2011, page. 62, 
lines 23-25 to page 63, lines 1-3. Emphasis added. See 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, p. 24. RECORD at 196. 
The collusion- - -the so-called "an additional agreement" 
(in the words of CEO Jonathan Ruga) between the two parties, 
SENTRY and BROWN, by which they would share in the proceeds 
from the sale of the additional items---constitutes the 
comp-lete lack of "good faith and fair dealing" the law 
requires. 
The instant situation---i.e. Defendant's unjustified 
"concealment" of the BROWN "paydown payment" from 1995 
onward, proceeding through the March 1995 foreclosure sale, 
· ;{:;he 1995 litigation filed and its "fraud upon the Court" 
misrepresentations, the FAA-licensing and the run-up to the 
October 1995 auction and the deceptive inducements that 
41 
GILLETT and MAJESTIC include "personal" assetsFOOTNOTE5 into 
the auction---justifies the invocation and application of 
the "equitable discovery" doctrine. The "equitable 
di'scovery" doctrine I and more particularly the II concealment II 
branch thereof, was described by the Utah Supreme Court in 
the case of Russell Packard Development, Inc. vs Carson, 
2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d 741 (Utah Supreme Court 2005) In 
Packard Development the Utah Supreme Court was called upon 
to review a Utah Court of Appeals decision which found the 
trial court had erred in dismissing a claim seemingly barred 
by a four-year statute of limitation. While the factual 
nature of the events leading to the litigation in Packard 
Development are complex, confusing and disputed, what the 
Utah Supreme Court said about the "equitable discovery" 
doctrine, and more particularly the "concealment" branch 
thereof, are helpful---i£ not actually dispositive---of the 
Defendant's "statute of limitations. In agreeing with the 
plaintiff's assertions that they did not have actual notice 
of the facts underlying their claims until after the statute 
of limitations had already expired, the Supreme Court 
observed: 
138 The problem with Defendants' argument is that, 
contrary to their assertions, inquiry notice 
operates differently "when a plaintiff alleges 
5 The collusive nature of the SENTRY proposal to BROWN 
(to make the "paydown payment" and thus become "partner" 
(undersigned's term) with SENTRY in the financial 
emasculation of the Plaintiffs was not fully disclosed to 
Plaintiffs until January 2010, when- - -pursuant to pre-trial 
discovery in this case---the SENTRY letter to BROWN was 
disclosed. 
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that a defendant took affirmative steps to-conceal 
the plaintiff's cause of action." Berenda, 914 
P. 2d at 51. When a plaintiff has made a prima 
facie showing of fraudulent concealment, a 
plaintiff will be charged with constructive notice· 
of facts forming the basis of a cause of action 
only at that point at which a plaintiff, 
reasonably on notice to inquire into a defendant's 
wrongdoing, would have, with due diligence, 
discovered the facts forming the basis for the 
cause of action despite the defendant's-efforts to 
conceal it. See id. at 51-52. 
~ 3 9 The question of when a plaintiff 
reasonably would have discovered the facts 
underlying a cause of action in light of 
defendant's affirmative concealment is a "highly 
fact-dependent legal question[]" that is 
"necessarily a matter left to trial courts and 
finders of fact." Id. at 53; cf. Spears, 2002 UT 
24 at~ 32, 44 P.3d 742 (" [T]he applicability of 
a statute of limitations and the discovery rule 
also involves ·a subsidiary factual determination- - · 
-the point at which a person reasonably should 
know that he or she has suffered a legal injury. 
This is a question of fact."). Thus, "weighing the 
reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct in light 
of the defendant's steps to conceal the cause of 
action necessitates the type of factual findings 
which preclude [judgment as a matter of law] in 
all but the clearest of cases," i.e. "when the 
facts fall on two opposite ends of a factual 
continuum." Berenda, 914 P. 2d at 54. These include 
situations in which either (1) "the facts are so 
clear that a reasonable person could not disagree 
about the underlying facts or about application of 
the governing legal standard to the facts, " or ( 2) 
"the facts underlying the allegation of fraudulent 
concealment are so tenuous, vague, or 
insufficiently established that . . the claim 
fails as-a matter of law." Id. 
2005 UT 14 at~~ 38-39, 108 P.3d at 750-751. Emphasis added. 
Footnote [ #7] at the end of the text in Paragraph 3 8 
omitted. 
The Utah Supreme Court's statement in Packard 
Development.that 
"weighing the reasonableness of the plaintiff's 
conduct in light of the defendant's steps to 
conceal the cause of action necessitates the type 
of factual findings which preclude [judgment as a 
43 
matter of law] in all but the clearest of cases," 
. . . . [ 2 0 0 5 UT 14 at ~ 3 9 , 10 8 P . 3 d at 7 51 . · 
Emphas i·s ·added. J 
indicates that "summary judgment" on this issue .is 
inappropriate. 
B 
Assuming-·- - for sake of argument, and ce·rtainly not so 
admitted---that there is uncertainty, even ambiguity, as to 
which of two, apparently-conflicting statutes of limitations 
to be a~plied in any given situation, the Court's selection 
of the 11 shorter" statute [for "fraud" J violates the long-
standing, even "black-letter law", principle that in such 
cases · the Court should select the ·11 1onger 11 statute of 
limitation. 
The statutory text of Section 78B-2-309(2) allows for 
application in any one of three distinct claims---i.e. upon 
a (1) "contract", (2) "obligation" . ., or (3) 11 liability 11 ---as 
long as it (the claim) is "founded upon an instrument in 
writing". [This interpretation is confirmed by similar 
(verbatim) text contained in Section 78B-2-307 (1) (a), Utah 
. . 
Code (4 year for claims "not founded upon an instrument in 
writing).] The statutory text of Section 78B-2-305(3) 
[statute of limitation for "fraud"] states: "for relief on 
the ground of ·fraud or mistake; II [While the word 
"relief 11 might itself be instructive and perhaps disposi ti ve 
(namely, a variety of remedies- - - i.e. recision, and. so 
forth---as contrasted with merely an award of damages for 
[breach of] "contract", an "obligation" or a "liability", 
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the singular usage of the word II fraud" (and "mistake") are 
noteworthy: "fraud" means "fraud", but the term doesn't 
mean---and shouldn't mean---"breach of contract", at least 
for statute of limitation purposes.] 
' The District Court's mistaken selection of the 3-year 
statute of limitation [under 78B-2-305(3): for "fraud"] in 
lieu of the 6-year statute [under 78B-2-309(2): for actions 
"upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an 
instrument in writing"] runs contrary to long-established, 
even "black-letter law". In Cathee vs Valen tiner Crane 
Brunjies Onyon, 944 P.2d 365 (Utah Supreme Court 1997), the 
Utah Supreme Court wrote: 
[ 9] Valentiner Crane notes, again, correctly, that 
"'we construe statutes liberally with a view to 
effect their objects and to promote justice.'" 
Durham. 893 P.2d at 583 (quoting Brickyard 
Homeowner' s Ass' n Managem~n t Comm. v. Gibbons 
Realty Co. , 6 6 8 P. 2 d 5 3 5, 5 3 8 ( Utah 19 8 3) ) 
However, 
[a] s a matter of policy, the view has 
been taken that where there is a 
substantial question which of two or more 
statutes of limitation within the 
jurisdiction should be applied, the doubt 
should be resolved in favor of 
application of the statute containing the 
longest limitation. In other words, if a 
substantial doubt exists as to which is 
the applicable statute of limitations, 
the longer rather than the shorter period 
of limitation is to be preferred. 
51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 63 
(footnote omitted). Therefore, if given a 
between statutes, we should apply the 
period. 
944 P.2d at 369. Emphasis added. 
(1970) 
choice 
longer 
The District Court---misconstruing the Plaintiffs' 
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"breach of contract" claims and thus improperly converting 
those claims into "fraud" claims, for which the 11 shorter" 
(ala 3-year) statute of limitation was applied---failed to 
follow this prin~iple. 
At this juncture (i.e. summary judgment context, 
wherein factual inferences viewed in favor of non-moving 
party, and nothing directly argued on this point), it is 
patently improper and unfair for the District Court- - -having 
heard no sworn testimony or examined any documents- - -to 
conclude that this case is NOT a "contract" case, seeking to 
establish liability "upon any contract, obligation, or 
liability founded upon an instrument in writing"? [Section 
78B-2~309, Utah Code.] Is it even possible---it generally 
isn't possible, logically or otherwise- - -for the Defendant's 
to "prove"---before the Court has heard any actual 
"evidence", that this case is NOT a "contract case"? The 
Rules require only a "short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" [Rule 8 (a) , 
Utah R. Ci v. P.] and " [ e] ach averment of a pleading shall be 
simple, concise, and direct" [Rule 8 ( e) ] , sufficient for 
"notice pleading" and for which any "obj ection 11 thereto 
{and/or demand for more definite statement) has been ·1·ong 
since waived. The Plaintiffs ought be given the opportunity 
to present their "breach of contract" claims at trial. To 
pre-judge the essence and substance of those claims---by 
applying an incorrect statute of limitations, so as to bar 
the presentation of those claims---is patently unfair. 
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It is ironic that the Defendants have claims that 
Plaintiffs' "fraud" claim against Defendant BROWN was not 
pleaded with the requisite the requisite "particularity" 
[Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure]---a conclusion 
disputed by Plaintiffs. Yet when the "breach of contract" 
claims- - -so expressly pleaded and designated, and certainly 
without the "particularity" required for "fraud"---were 
pleaded, the District Court nevertheless construes them to 
be "for fraud" and applies the shorter statute of 
limitation. 
Similar to the case-at-hand, Cathee involved "economic 
damages", as contrasted with "personal injuries". The Utah 
Supreme Court resolved the appealed issue- - -on interlocutory 
appeal of the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss on 
. . 
grounds of a shorter statute of limitations---in these 
words: 
Cathco has not brought an action for injuries 
to persons or property against Valentiner Crane. 
Instead, it seeks purely economic damages arising 
from the alleged breach of the contract between 
the parties. Therefore, section 78-12-25.5 (3) does 
not apply. FN Rather, this case is governed by 
section 78-12-23(2), which explicitly addresses 
"liability founded upon an instrument in writing" 
and provides for a six-year limitation period. 
944 P.2d at 370. Emphasis added. Text of footnote ["FN"] 
(concerning legislative amendment of that statute [78-12-
25.5(3)] the Court expressly found inapplicable) omitted. 
C 
For essentially the same reasons, the Plaintiffs' 
"breach of contract" against Defendant BROWN as uniquely 
alleged within the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION should not be 
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improperly converted into a "fraud" claim, especially when 
those "fraud" claims are separately pleaded, as contained 
within the THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Those "breach of contract 11 claims against BOYD J BROWN 
are likewise preserved- - - extended until "discovery" pursuant 
to application of the "fraudulent concealment" doctrine---
and are timely. [Application of the "fraudulent concealment" 
doctrine, in accordance with Packard Development ( a 11 breach 
of contract" case not thus converted into a "fraud" claim) 
and related cases, neither mandates nor allows "conversion" 
of a pleaded "breach of contract" claim into an unpleaded 
"fraud" claim. J The "breach of contract" claims pleaded 
against Defendant BOYD J BROWN are entitled to a 6-year 
statute of limitation. 
III 
THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION FOR 
DEFENDANT BROWN'S FRAUD AND BREACH OF CONTRACT 
WERE TOLLED, PURSUANT TO STATUTE [78B-2-104], 
DUE TO BROWN'S CONTINUOUS ABSENCE FROM THE STATE 
A 
The District Court erred in failing to take into 
account and apply the provisions of Section 78B-2-104 
[effect of absence from state] (and its predecessor 
provisions, at Section 78-12-35, prior to 2008) against 
Defendant BOYD J BROWN, so as to "toll" the "running" of the 
statute of limitation against him, by reason of that 
continuous absence, as per sworn te~timony before the Court 
and for which no rebuttal thereto was offered or identified. 
Section 78B-2-104, Utah Code, provides: 
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78B-2-104 Effect of absence from state. 
If a cause of action against a person while the 
person is out of the state, the action may be 
commenced within the term as limited by this. 
chapter after his return to the state. If after a 
cause of action accrues the person departs from 
the state, the time of his absence is not part of 
the time limited for the commencement of the 
action. 
Emphasis added. [Similar provisions were formerly (pre-2 008) 
contained in Section 78-12-35, repealed and replaced in the 
2008 legislative recodification of Title 78.] 
In this case, Defendant BROWN has not resided in Utah 
on a continuous basis since the 1990s; he (in the mid-1990i 
or earlier) changed his residence and domicile to the State 
bf Wyoming . (Teton County) and has continuously resided 
there. See AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K GILLETT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL. [RECORD at p. 613-614] Thus, due to BROWN'S 
permanent "absence from the state" due to his residence in 
Wyoming (and/or lengthy half-year annual vacations in 
Mexico), the "statute of limitation" effectively never 
commences or "runs". This result---that the statute 
effectively never II runs 11 - - - is applicable to both the II fraud 11 
claim (a three-year statute, tolled until discovery) as well 
as the longer (" six year") statute for the "breach· of 
contract" claims. Thus, the District Court's "dismissal" of 
the Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant BOYD J BROWN was in 
error. 
In the spring of 2oi1, with pre-trial depositions 
contemplated and requested',, Defendants' counsel (Mr Ault) 
attempted unsuccessfully to assert that BROWN'S deposition 
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be taken IN WYOMING. When BROWN'S deposition was finally 
taken, it was taken weeks "later" than the other two (Ruga 
and Gillett) depositions taken simultaneously, in order to 
allow Mr BROWN to return to the United States from his 
regular months-long winter vacation in Mexico. After Mr 
BROWN returned to the United States, his counsel (Mr Ault) 
wanted the deposition to be taken in Wyoming. In framing his 
request for a "protective order'' (so as to mandate that Mr 
BROWN'S deposition be taken in the state of his residence: 
Wyoming), Defendant's counsel wrote: 
6. Defendant Boyd J. Brown is a resident of 
Jackson, ··Wyoming, which is approximately a five 
hour drive from Salt Lake City. 
7. Defendant Brown is not anticipated to be in 
the State of Utah prior to the trial of this 
matter. 
Emphasis added. Page 2 of DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF OBJECTION AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER, dated 11 
September 2011. [RECORD at 149] 
Later in that same document, in the "Argument" section, 
Defendant's counsel (Mr Ault) wrote: 
In the case at bar, Defendant Brown was a 
resident of Utah in the mid 19 9 0 ' s when the 
actions complained of the Complaint occurred. 
Since that time Defendant Brown has relocated to 
Jackson Wyoming and makes infrequent trips to 
Utah. The Plaintiff decided to bring the action in 
the Third District. Mr. Brown has no plans to 
return to Utah at the present time. 
Emphasis added. Page 3 of DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF OBJECTION AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER, dated 11 
September 2011. [RECORD at 150] 
Plaintiffs' claims and allegations, as embodied within 
the filed Complaint, are accurate and validated: 
3. The Defendant BOYD J BROWN is a natural person 
50 
C 
C. 
G 
C 
C 
u 
() 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
and is presently a resident of the State . of 
Wyoming. At times material hereto, Defendant BOYD 
J BROWN was a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Emphasis added. COMPLAINT, 1 3. RECORD at 2. 
Defendants failed to contest DAVID K GILLETT'S 
affidavit (that BROWN has continuously resided in Wyoming 
and Mexico; had the Defendants done so, such disputation 
would have raised the "genuine issue of disputed material 
fact" which would have precluded the grariting of summary 
judgment. 
.B 
The District Court's infusion [see pages 6 thru 8 of 
the "RULING" document, entered 24 June 2014: RECORD at 951-
954; ATTACHMENT #2 of ADDENDA to this brief] of "long arm 
jurisdiction" concepts (namely, that the Plaintiffs knew 
where BROWN resided out-of-state and could have served him, 
as was ultimately accomplished) does not resolve the 
situation. The statute---78B-2-304---still tolls the running 
of the statute,·· because the Defendant is out-of-state, 
regardless of whether the Plaintiff knew where the Defendant 
was. 
C 
The District Court ruled that the Plaintiffs had until 
2005 to file suit against the Defendants, but having failed 
to do so, the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the three-
year statute of limitation .. The Court's decision overlooks 
the 2003 filing [Case No. 030919800: ATTACHMENT 3], which 
was timely .. The claims therein were "preserved" until June 
I 51 
2006, when the case was dismissed. The June 2007 filing of 
the case preserved the claims, pursuant to the "saving 
statute" [Section 78-12-40, Utah Code, which did not then 
contain any restriction or limitation as to its use] , and/ or 
the 2007-filed litigation [Case No. 070409723: ATTACHMENT 
4], which preserved the claims. 
Plaintiffs' "breach of contract" claims, for which the 
C 
---·~----&6 ...... ,·~@teta>r-s-~tr-e-e.f-l-i-mi~&a-tr-i-0n-wa-s---t-01J.,ed--(unti-l--March---2-O0-2......,by...,,._,~---() 
application of the · "equitable concealment" doctrine of 
Packard Development), were re-filed on 29 September 2008. 
Those claims are nevertheless still timely---and within the 
6-year statute---by reason of the June 2007-refiling of the 
case [actually captioned "David K Gillett et al vs Boyd J 
Brown" but in the District Court's computerized data-base 
entitled Maj es tic Airlines, Incorporated et al vs SFC 
Aircraft Corp I et al and containing verbatim claims] and 
the Utah "savings. statute" [Section 78-12-40, Utah Code 
(pre-2008); Section 78B-2-111, Utah Code (2008 and later)], 
when that former litigation was dismissed [23 October 2007] 
by !eason of Plaintiff's failure to serve the Defendants 
within 120 days of filing. See Complaint, ~~ 8-10. See also 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
PLAINTIFFS, dated/filed 24 November 2012, pp. 20-21. [RECORD 
at 406-442, and more specifically at 426-427] 
# 
# 
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IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING 
THAT THE CLAIMS OF MAJESTIC AIRLINES 
WERE NOT TIMELY MADE PURSUANT 
TO THE WINDING UP OF ITS CORPORATE AFFAIRS 
Where the issue involves interpretation and application 
of a statute, the appellate court grants the trial court no 
deference but reviews the conclusion for correctness. Salt 
Lake Child and Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. vs Frederick, 890 
P.2d 1017 (Utah Supreme Court 1995). Young Electric Sign 
Company, Inc. vs State ex rel UDOT, 2005 UT App 169, 110 
P.3d 1118 (Utah Court of Appeals 2005). 
Paragraph 2 of the SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K 
GILLETT [RECORD at 444] expressly states that the instant 
litigation was brought against the Defendants pursuant to 
the 11 winding up 11 of the corporate affairs of MAJESTIC 
AIRLINES. The foregoing statement was unrebutted by the 
Defendants. [Any such factual statement contradicting those 
facts would have created the 11 genuine dispute of material 
fact 11 which would have precluded the granting of summary 
judgment on that issue.] 
Notwithstanding that authoritative statement by a 
corporate officer [GILLETT], unrebutted by the Defendants, 
the District Court nevertheless ruled [page·3 of 11 RULING 11 
document, ATTACHMENT 2, RECORD at 948] that the MAJESTIC 
AIRLINES claims were (1) barred, as not being pursuant to 
the 11 winding up 11 process of the corporate entity, and (2) 
that the claims, as 11 assets 11 , were thus transferred to DAVID 
K GILLETT as the sole shareholder of the corporation. [To 
53 
the recollection of the undersigned, there was no evidence 
before the District Court that David K Gillett was the so~e 
shareholder.] On_both aspects of the ruling, the District 
Court erred. 
Section 16-l0a-1405, Utah Code [adopted in 1992 and not 
subsequently amended through 2008] provides, in relevant 
part: 
16-lOa-1405 Effect of Dissolution 
(1) A dissolved corporation continues its 
corporate existence but may not carry on any 
business except that appropriate to wind up and 
liquidate its business and affairs, including: 
(a) collecting its assets; 
(2) Dissolution of a corporation does not: 
(a) transfer title to the corporation's property; 
( e) prevent commencement of a proceeding 
by or against the corporation in its 
corporate name; 
Emphasis added. 
As can be seen, the second ruling (pertaining to 
"transfer" of corporate "assets"---in this case the legal 
claims against the Defendants) clearly contradicts the clear 
meaning of • Subsection 16-l0a-1405. There was no sworn 
testimony concerning any such "transfer". As "a matter of 
law", the District Court's ruling is clearly erroneous. 
The District Court's "winding up" ruling is similarly 
flawed. First, because there was no "evidence II to contradict 
the "sworn testimony" of Plaintiff GILLETT, who as a 
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corporate officer, was knowledgeable to make such. a 
statement. The District Court is not at liberty to ignore 
sworn testimony. 
secondly, the "winding up" provisions of Section 16-
l0a-1405 do not contain any express provision as to the 
time-frame in which the 11 winding up II should occur. As noted 
herein (concerning the "statutes of limitation" and their 
application to the case at bar), the "winding up" 
activities---particularly 
litigation 11 - - -ought to be 
statute of limitation. 
those involving "filed 
as II long 11 as the applicable 
Lastly, assuming that a statute of limitation primarily 
benefits the potential defendant, the Defendants in this 
case should not be heard to complain about the relative 
"lateness" of the "winding up" activity (i.e. filing the 
lawsuit) when those Defendants actively and affirmatively---
as they have admitted---kept the 11 paydown payment" secret. 
[As noted, the "collusive"---certainly violative of the 
"implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing"---nature 
of the Defendants' relationship with each other vis-a-vis 
the Plaintiffs -was not disclosed until January 2010, 
pursuant to documents provided pursuant to pre-trial 
II discovery".] The Plaintiff MAJESTIC AIRLINES cannot be 
expected to act upon a claim it is unaware---because of the 
fraudulent concealment knowingly perpetrated upon it by the 
Defendants---it actually has. 
# 
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V 
DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN INCORRECTLY UNDERSTANDING AND 
APPLYING THE "FIRST BREACH 11 DOCTRINE TO THE CASE 
In accordance with Rule 56, motions for summary 
judgment are appropriate only in situations where the 
material facts are not in genuine dispute and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See also 
Kouris vs Utah Highway Patrol, 2003 UT 19, 70 P.3d 72 (Utah 
Supreme Court 2003); Hill vs Allred, 2001 UT 16, 28 P.3d 
1271 (Utah Supreme Court 2001), on subsequent appeal 2009 UT 
28, 216 P.3d 929 (Utah Supreme Court 2009). The appellate 
review is for II correctness 11 • IHC Heal th Services, Inc. vs D 
& K Management, Inc., 2008 UT 73, 196 P.3d 588 (Utah Supreme 
Court 2008); Overstock.com, Inc. vs SmartBargains, Inc., 
2008 UT 55, 192 P.3d 858 (Utah Supreme Court 2008). The 
appellate court affords no deference to the lower court's 
legal conclusions. Christensen & Jensen, P.C. vs Barrett & 
Daines, 2008 UT 64, 194 P.3d 931 (Utah Supreme Court 2008); 
Pearce vs Utah Athletic Foundation, 2008 UT 13, 179 P.3d 760 
(Utah Supreme Court 2 0 0 8) . Factual inferences and the 
evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment. Lucky Seven Rodeo Corporation vs 
Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah Court of Appeals 1988); Western 
Water, LLC vs Olds, 2008 UT 18, 184 P.3d 578 (Utah Supreme 
Court 2008). If the appellate court concludes that a genuine 
issue of material fact exists, the appellate court must 
reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for trial 
on that issue. Bowler vs Deseret Village Association, Inc., 
56 
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922 P. 2d 8 (Utah Supreme Court 1996); English vs Kienke, 774 
P.2d 1154 (Utah Court of Appeals 1989), affirmed 848 P.2d 
153. 
In this case, the District Court's legal conclusion is 
the assumed "breach" of provisions of the contractual 
documents which were not before the Court. Whether a 
particular breach of contract is material is a conclusion of 
law to be reviewed independently by the appellate court. 
Saunders vs Sharp, 840 P.2d 796 (Utah Court of Appeals 
1992). 
In its June 2014 "RULING" document [RECORD at 948-949], 
the District Court sua sponte raised the "first brea.ch" 
doctrine as a basis upon which to bar Plaintiffs' claims. As 
the RULING---purporting to resolve Plaintiffs' "new trial" 
and related motions- - -was essentially "final" [see final 
written paragraph of RULING: RECORD at 955], Plaintiffs had 
no opportunity to present any response thereto. 
Those p·ortio.ns of the District Court's June 2014 RULING 
[p. 3-4, RECORD at 948-949] pertaining to the "first breach 
doctrine" - - -other than evidencing the District Court's 
continuing misunderstanding of the case and the application 
of the applicable "law" ("contract" and/or !!statute· of 
limitation") principles---are erroneous and must be set 
aside. 
In the first instance, any District Court ruling---
that's right, ANY ruling-.,.-as to any "breach" situation by 
the Plaintiffs was NOT properly before the Court: 
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1. No 11 motion 11 - - -in II summary judgment II nor any 
other context---had been filed; correspondingly, 
the Plaintiffs, as the nonmoving (sic) party 
thereto, had no opportunity to respond thereto. 
2. The Court 1 s "first breach II ruling was made 
without the benefit of any evidence. The 
provisions of the 40+ pages of the 1994 "loan 
documents II were not before the Court, could not be 
examined and/or read by the Court, and were not 
presented and II argued 11 by the parties. For the 
Court to make a conclusory---perhaps arguably 
dispositive---determination concerning the 
contractual obligations arising from documents 
which the Court has not read is patently· improper. 
Similarly, no II facts II of any II breach II was 
presented. 
3. The 1995 SENTRY-filed litigation was not 
contested nor was it formally responded to; in 
lieu of challenging the claims made in the 
11 Sentry 11 complaint, the parties agreed with each 
other merely that a II default judgment 11 could be 
entered against MAJESTIC AIRLINES---but not 
against DAVID K GILLETT---and that was it. 
4. Plaintiff GILLETT, who has legitimate 
contract-based rights, expectations and claims---
including those pleaded herein---in and from his 
capacity as 11 co-guarantor 11 within the 11 guarantee 11 
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documents he 
default and 
personally 
did not 
signed---was 
"breach" the 
NOT in 
original 
contracts. Thus, the "first breach" doctrine can 
have no application against him. 
5. The 40+ pages of provisions incorporated_ 
complex commercial loan provisions, describing 
several contingencies and provided for alternative 
remedies (for example, repossession and/or 
disposition of the collateral pledged to secure 
repayment), waiver and/or 11 cure 11 of default, and 
other situations and results. Those remedies are 
simultaneously controlled by statutory provisions 
(for example, Article 9 of the UCC) in addition to 
the contractual terms. To approach the situation 
as though MAJESTIC AIRLINES' "default" in making 
the monthly 
6. The Defendants did not, in a "walk-away" 
fashion, seek (or purport to seek) to rescind the 
contract, so as to excuse their own 11perf ormance 11 • 
To the contrary, the Defendants (ala SENTRY 
FINANCIAL) sought continued application and 
enforcement of the various contractual provisions 
(for example, repossession and/or disposition of 
the pledged collateral). SENTRY, as a putative 
beneficiary of any application of the II first 
breach" doctrine, should be deemed to have thus 
waived invocation of the doctrine: first by reason 
59 
of the written contractual provisions identifying 
the complex resolution of any 11 breach 11 , and 
secondly by reason of SENTRY'S continued 
utilization of those contractual provisions, as 
the parties had originally agreed. 
7. The "first breach" doctrine has no application 
to the case at hand. The eventual failure of 
MAJESTIC AIRLINES to make a monthly payment (or 
even a series of such failures) was merely a 
situation the parties contemplated in advance and 
for which they made provisions; in this situation, 
the "first breach" doctrine is inapplicable. 
The District Court's "first breach" ruling came about 
within the Court's attempt to resolve the "motion for new 
trial" issues. The District Court, as noted above, had no 
opportunity to read the 40+ pages of the 11 loan documents". 
Nor did the Court have opportunity to hear the · oral 
testimony of the witnesses. 
The District Court's gratuitous reference to (and, if 
any, utilization of) the "first breach" doctrine must simply 
be overturned. 
The "first breach" -doctrine should be declared to be 
inapplicable in this complex case beginning with 40+ pages 
of writ ten "contracts", divided among twelve distinct 
documents and involving three additional "co-guarantor" 
parties (BROWN I GILLETT and MAJESTIC HOLDINGS) . The District 
Court's making of a seemingly dispositive ruling (i.e. that 
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Plaintiffs, "first breach" precludes future claims or 
~xpectation~ against contracting parti~s) on the basii of 
supposed facts not actually presented and within contractual 
documents not actually read is error. The case must be 
remanded for trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court's granting of "summary judgment" ( on 
essentially statute of limitation grounds) was in error and 
must be reversed. 
The District Court's conscious misapprehension and 
mischaracterization of Plaintiffs' clearly-pleaded 11 bre·ach 
of contract" claims- - -against both· Defendants- - -and the 
resultant application of the shorter "for fraud" statute of 
limitation must be set aside. The Plaintiffs are entitled to 
try their case. 
The District Court's ruling ignoring the unrebutted 
"sworn evidence" that Boyd Brown was continuously a 
"resident of Wyoming" and the application of Section 78B-2-
3 04, Utah Code ["effect of absence from the state" J likewise 
must · be set aside. The statute is applicable to· the 
Plaintiffs' "fraud" claims (against BROWN) as well as the 
"breach of contract" claim. 
The District Court misapplied the "first breach" 
doctrine. Even though MAJESTIC AIRLINES was "late'' in its 
monthly payments as to the loan repayments, the other 
provisions of the extensive contractual provisions---for 
example, the "guarantee" agreement and its provisions 
61 
from/by Defendant BROWN---are still applicable and 
enforceable. Indeed, the parties---and most particularly, 
SENTRY FINANCIAL, who prepared the docurnents---intended the 
disposition of collateral provisions to be applicable. The 
Defendants' conscious disregard of those provisions must be 
litigated. 
The District· Court's ''winding up" and "transfer" 
rulings must be set aside. 
The summary judgment must be set aside and the case 
remanded for trial on the merits. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellants respectfully request the case be scheduled 
for "oral argument" prior to the Court's considering the 
case for decision. 
COUNSEL'S CERTIFICATION ["WORD COUNT" AND PRINT SIZE] 
The undersigned counsel certifies that foregoing 
APPELLANTS/ BRIEF/ exclusive of the caption/ II table of 
contents" and "table of authorities 11 , and addendum 
materials, had- - -verified by the WordPerfect 5. 1 word-
processing program with which the brief was prepared and 
compiled- - -a "word count" of 12,868 words. The material 
provisions of the brief (text and footnotes) were printed 
13-point Courrier type. 
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of February, 2015. 
/s/ Stephen G Horner 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
DAVID K GILLETT and 
MAJESTIC AIRLINES, INC. 
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ADDENDUM 
ATTACHMENT #1. ORDER FROM HEARING ON MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (December 16, 2013), entered 
13 April 2014 
ATTACHMENT #2. RULING denying Plaintiffs' 
motions for new trial and to set aside judgment, 
entered 25 June 2014. 
ATTACHMENT #3. DOCKET HISTORY of David K 
Gillett et al vs Boyd J Brown et al, Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, Civil No. 030919800. See document for 
complete listing of all parties. [3 pages] Case 
filed 5 September 2003; dismissed 14 June 2006. 
ATTACHMENT #4. DOCKET HISTORY of Maj es tic 
Airlines, Inc. et al vs SFC Air Corp I et al, 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, Civil No. 070409723. See document for 
complete listing of all parties. [2 pages] Case 
filed 13 June 2007; dismissed 23 October 2007. 
CERTIFICATE 
I certify that - I caused two copies of the foregoing 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF to be hand-delivered to the office of Mr 
Christopher Ault, Attorn·ey at Law, The Ault Firm, 8817 South 
Redwood Road, Suite A, West Jordan, Utah 84088, this 2nd day 
of February, 2015. 
/s/ Stephen G Horner 
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entered 25 June 2014. 
ATTACHMENT #3. DOCKET HISTORY of David K 
Gillett et al vs Boyd J Brown et al, Third 
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filed 5 September 2003; dismissed 14 June 2006. 
ATTACHMENT #4. DOCKET HISTORY of Maj es tic 
Airlines, Inc. et al vs SFC Air Corp I et al, 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, Civil No. 070409723. See document for 
complete listing of all parties. [2 pages] Case 
filed 13 June 2007; dismissed 23 October 2007. 
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Christopher M. Ault, #11000 
Zachary ·W. Powell, #147j6 
THE AULT FIRM, P.C. 
8817 S. Redwood Rd., Ste. A 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
Telephone: (801) 539-9000 
Facsimile: (801) 207-1056 
Email: zachary@aultlegal.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID K. GILLETT, an individual, and 
MAJESTIC AIRLINES, 
INCORPORATED, a Utah Corporation, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER FROM HEARING ON 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
- - u ....... ~ ·- -· - --·- -------- ----- - • 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BOYD J. BROWN, an individual, SENTRY ) 
FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a Utah ) 
Corporation, and SFC AIRCRAFT CORP I, ) 
a Utah Corporation, ) 
Defendants. 
f 
) 
) 
JUDGMENT 
(December 16, 2013) 
Civil No.: 080921211 
·· J~dge L.A. Dever 
COMES NOW the Court, having held a hearing on the parties' Motions for Summary 
Judgment on December 16, 2013, with Plaintiff represented by Steven Homer and Defendants 
represented by Christopher M. Ault and Zachary W. Powell, having considered the parties' 
motions, memoranda, declarations, and arguments made by counsel, and for good cause 
showing, 
It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that: 
Page 11 
ATTACHMENT .1 
April 13, 201411:03 PM 
~age 1 of 3 pages 
1. Plaintiff Majestic is no longer a viable corporation, Majestic's winding-up period 
has expired, and Majestic may not assert any claims. 
2. Plaintiff Gillett is the successor in interest and has the right to assert Majestic's 
claims. 
3. The statute of limitations for Plaintiff's cause of action of fraud expired in 2005. 
4. Plaintiffs filed this case in 2008. 
5. Even· considering the savings statute, Plaintiff failed to file his cause of action of 
fraud within the statute oflimitations, and all Plaintiff's fraud claims are 
dismissed with prejudice. 
· --------- ··--· -- - 6:-··The statute of limitations for breach of contract is six years.-··----------·--·-·---·----------- --- -- -------
7. Gillett and/or Majestic breached its contract with Sentry in 1995, and the statute 
of limitations ran ·in 200 J. 
8. Concealment is al issue, but the alleged concealtnent was a concealment of fraud. 
; ' 
The statute oflimitations for the concealment is therefore tolled until 2002, and 
the statute oflimit:tions forthe concealed fraud expired in 2005. 
9. The parties signed :1 val id release of all claims in 1996. All claims are thereby 
released except for Plaintiff's claim of fraud, which was discovered in 2002. The 
statut.e of limitations for fraud expired in 2005. 
_10. The Court dismis~es with prejudice all claims asserted by Plaintiff in this matter. 
The Court:~ Signature and Date of Entry of this Order Appear on the First Page of this 
· Docu,nent. 
Page I 2 
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ATTACHMENT 1 
Pa~e 2 of 3 pages ql1J9 2of3 
Q 
NOTT CE TO PLAINTIFF AND COUNSEL 
Notice is hereby given that pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
any objections you have to this proposed order must be ~led with the Court within 5 days of 
service of this proposed order. 
DATED this 19th day of March, 2014. 
THE AULT FIRM, P.C. 
Isl Zachary W. Powell 
Zachary W. Powell 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the forgoing document was served via 
electronic filing, this J 91h day of" March, 2014, to the following: 
Stephen G. Homer 
2877 West 9150 South 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
Isl Zachary W. Powell 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE cou~ DIBTR1cr 
· · ST ATE OF UT AH rd Judtotat 0 f0UR: Str/ct 
DAVID K. GILLETT, an individual, and 
MAJESTIC AIRLINES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
BOYD J. BROWN, an individual, 
SENTRY FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and SFC AIRCRAFT 
CORP I, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
Case No. 080921211 
Judge: L.A. DEVER 
The above entitled matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Notice to Submit for 
Decision their Rule 59(b) Motion for New Trial and Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside 
,. 
Judgmenfand, Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendants' Judgment and this Court's entry 
thereof, filed April 29, 2014. Having reviewed Plaintiffs' Motion and Objection and 
Defendants' Oppositions thereto, and being duly advised in the premises of the matters 
before it, the Court makes the following RuUng. 
Background 
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on September 29, 2008. The following are 
relevant claims as asserted by Plaintiffs in their Complaint: 
1. Defendant Boyd J. Brown was, at the time of the filing of the Complaint, a 
resident of Wyoming. (Comp!. 'ff 3). 
2. However, at all relevant times, Mr. Brown was a resident of Salt Lake 
County, Utah. Id. at 'ff 4. 
ATTACHMENT 2 
Page 1 of 11 pages 
3. Defendants Sentry Financial Corporation ("Sentry") and SFC Aircraft Corp 
I ("SFC"), are Utah corporations, with headquarters in Salt Lake County, 
Utah. Id. at 11114-5. 
4. Jurisdiction, both subject matter and personal, are appropriate before this 
Court. Id. at 117. 
5. Plaintiffs' causes of action include: (1) Breach of Contract against Mr. 
Brown, id. at 111147-48; (2) Breach of Contract against Sentry and SFC, 
id. at ,m 49-50; (3) Fraud against Mr. Brown, jg. at ffll 51-58; (4) Judicial 
Accounting, id. at 111159-60; and (5) Declaratory Judgment, id. at ,m 61-
63. 
6. In 1994, Plaintiff Majestic Airlines ("Majestic") 1 entered into a contract with 
Defendant(s) Sentry and/or SFC. !d. at ,r 13. See also (Defs.' Opp. To 
Pis.' Mot. For Part. Summ. J. and Mem. In Supp. of Defs.' Counter Mot. 
For Summ. J. vi-x). 
7. In or about March 1995, Majestic was in default on the terms of 
agreement it had with Sentry. Id. at 1119. 
8. Plaintiffs allege that they were unaware of Sentry's receipt of Mr. Brown's 
$250,0002, payment until "March 2002 when such payment was disclosed 
during the deposition of Sentry officials[.)" Id. at 1144; see also 1150. 
Compare (Defs.' Opp. To Pis.' Mot. For Part. Summ. J. and Mem. In 
1Majestic has been dissolved as a company since in or about April 1996. (Defs.' Opp. To Pis.' 
Mot. For Part. Summ. J. and Mem. In Supp. of Defs.' Counter Mot. For Summ. J. x, 111124-25). 
2Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Complaint, this alleged payment occurred after Majestic had defaulted the 
terms of the agreement at issue, in or about July 1995. Id. at 1J 25. 
2 
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9. 
10. 
Supp.· of Defs.' Counter Mot. For Summ. J. 1-16). 
On December 6, 1996, the parties entered into a release agreement in 
which Plaintiffs released all their claims against Defendants. Id. at 1142. 
See Compare (Defs.' Opp. To Pis.' Mot. For Part. Summ. J. and Mem. In 
Supp. of Defs.' Counter Mot. For Summ. J. Ex. F). 
Plaintiffs also allege that they did not "discover'' Mr. Brown's alleged 
fraud3, i.e., allegedly fraudulently inducing Plaintiffs to sign the release, id. 
at 111156-57, until the "March 2002 deposition of Jonathan Ruga, SFC 
Aircraft I[.]" Id. at 1153. Compare (Defs.' Opp. To Pis.' Mot. For Part. 
Summ. J. and Mem. In Supp. of Defs.' Counter Mot. For Summ. J. 1-16). 
Following a hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on 
December 16, 2013, the Courtheld: 
(1) . Majestic is not a proper party to the entitled matter as it was dissolved as 
a corporation in or about April 1996. Therefore, the true party in interest is 
Plaintiff David K. Gillett. 
(2) Plaintiffs' were the first party to breach4 the contract at issue in 1995 and 
therefore, the six (6) year statute of limitations expired in 2001. Utah 
3Again, pursuant to Plaintiffs' Complaint, the alleged fraud "in violation of [Mr. Brown's] own 
contractual obligations" in or about April 1996, occurred well after Majestic's breach of the contract Id. at 
'ff40. 
4See e.g. CCD, LC. v. Millsap. 2005 UT 42, 'ff 29, 116 P.3d 366 ewe have explained that under 
the 'first breach' rule a party first guilty of a substantial or material breach of contract cannot complain if 
the other party thereafter refuses to perform. He can neither insist on performance by the other party nor 
maintain an action against the other party for a subsequent failure to perform. a ( citations and quotations 
omitted)}; Saunders v. Sharp. 840 P.2d 796, 806 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that "a party committing 
a substantial breach of a contract cannot maintain an action against the other contracting party ... for a 
subsequent failure to perform if the promises are dependent.• (citation omitted)). 
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Code Ann. §78B-2-309(2) (2008). See also (Defs.' Opp. To Pis.' Mot. For 
Part. Summ: J. and Mem. In Supp. of Defs.' Counter Mot. For Summ. J. 
Exs. A5, 86). 
(3) Although concealment is at issue, the concealment pertains to 
Defendants' alleged fraud inducing Plaintiffs to sign the release in 
December 1996, which Plaintiffs alleged to not have discovered until 
March 2002. (Compl. ffll 53, 56-57). 
(a) Because the alleged fraud was claimed to be discovered by 
Plaintiffs in March 2002, Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action, Fraud 
against Mr; Brown ran in March 2005. Moreover, Plaintiffs' June 
2007 case 070409723, filed in West Jordan, did not save or 
5The April 29, 1994 Letter Agreement, subsection 10 provides in relevant part: 
In the event of a breach by MAI [Majestic], Gillett or Boyd of any of these terms or 
conditions of the Sentry Loan Documents, MAI, Gillett and Boyd jointly and 
severally agree to pay all of Sentry's costs and expenses incurred with the 
breach[.] 
(emphasis added). 
6The Guarantee and Waiver signed by Mr. Brown, which outlines the obligations and rights of Mr. 
Brown and Sentry, respectively, provides in relevant part: 
(b) Sentry may at any time and from time to time ... upon or without any·terms or 
conditions and in whole or in part: ... (2) sell, exchange, release, surrender, 
realize upon or otherwise deal with i'n any manner and in any order any property 
by whomsoever at any time pledged or mortgaged to secure, or howsoever 
securing the Liabilities of the Obligor [Majestic) hereby guaranteed ... (4) settle 
or compromise any Liabilities of the Obligor hereby guaranteed, any security 
thereof, or any liability (including those hereunder) incurred directly or indirectly in 
respect or hereof, and may subordinate the payment of all or any part thereof to 
the payment of any liability (whether due or not) of the Obligor to creditors of the 
Obliger other than Sentry and the undersigned; and (5) apply any sums by 
whomsoever paid or howsoever realized to any and all Liabilities of the Obliger to 
Sentry regardless of what liability or Liabilities of the Obliger remain unpaid. 
(emphasis added). 
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0 otherwise preserve Plaintiffs' fraud claim because it was still filed 
two (2) years after the three (3) year statute of limitations had run. 
See Utah Code Ann. §788-2-305(3) (2008); see also Hom v. Utah 
0 Dep't of Pub. Safety. 962 P ._2d 95, 1027 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(4) In order to set aside the December 1996 Mutual Release ("Release"), 
Plaintiffs' were required to have filed their Third Cause of Action, Fraud 
against Mr. Brown, no later than March 2005, which was three (3) years 
after the Plaintiffs allegedly discovered said fraud in March 2002. Having 
failed to timely file any fraud claim until 2007, the Release therefore 
appropriately applies to Plaintiffs' remaining claims. 
Analysis and Discussion 
1 Plaintiffs Rule 59(b) and 60(b) Motion 
On March 15, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their Rule 59(b) and 60(b) Motion. Although 
the docket reflects that Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in support, the memorandum is 
the exact same as the original Motion. That is, both documents are approximately 
three (3) pages long and do not provide any legal support, analysis, or discussion. The 
Court finds that Plaintiffs' arguments, as reflected in the Motion, are untenable. 
First, Plaintiffs assert that ''the Court misapprehended (and thus overlooked" the 
true •contractually-based' nature of the Plaintiffs' claim (against SENTRY} and instead 
improperly converted Plaintiffs' claims to allege 'fraud,' for which a shorter statute of 
7 ("Simple ignorance of or obliviousness to the existence of a cause of action will not prevent the 
running of the statute of limitations. All that is required to trigger the statute of limitations is ... sufficient 
information to ... put [plaintiffs] on notice to make further inquiry if they harbor doubts or questions." 
(citations and quotations omitted)). 
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limitation would apply." (Pis.' R. 59(b) and 60(b) Mot. 2). This claim is inconsistent with 
the Court's December 16, 2013, ruling, in which the Court specifically found that the 
contractual claims, I.e., Plaintiffs' first and second causes of action, were barred by the 
six (6) year statute of limjtations as Plaintiffs themselves asserted, they breached the 
terms of the April 1994 Letter Agreement in mid-1995 but did not file any suit unfit June 
2007. See supra at 4. See also fn. 4. 
Plaintiffs also assert that the Court failed to consider Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78B-2-1048 in its consideration of Plaintiffs' fraud claim against Mr. Brown. 
Although Plaintiffs specifically cite Section 788-2-104 in its Motion, following 
Defendants' Opposition, Plaintiffs, in their Reply, assert that the pre-2008 amended 
version, Section 78-12-359 is applicable. The Court finds that under either version 
Plaintiffs'·claim that Mr. Brown's out-of-state resident status tolls the statute limitations 
fails. 
In signing the April 29, 1994, Letter Agreement and Guarantee and Waiver, Mr. 
Brown consented to resolve all matters in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Third Judicial 
8States: 
If a cause of action accrues against a person while the person is out of the_ state 
and the person is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state in accordance 
with Section 788-3-205, the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this 
chapter after his return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues the person departs 
from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action unless Section 78B-3-205 applies. 
(emphasis added). 
9States: 
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state, 
the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after his return to 
the state. If after a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the time of his 
absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. 
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District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (Defs.' Opp. To Pis.' Mot For Part. 
Summ. J. and Mem. In Supp. of Defs.' Counter Mot. For Summ. J. Exs. A at 1112, Bat 
11 i). Neither party disputes the validity of the noted forum selection clauses. 
In instances in which there is an enforcea~le forum selection clause, "(only] a 
'rational nexus' between Utah and the underlying dispute [must be shown]. This nexus 
need not meet the more rigorous minimum contacts standard utilized in those cases 
where a forum selection clause is not present" Jacobsen Const. Co., Inc. v. Teton 
Builders, 2005 UT 4, 1132, 106 P.3d 719 (citing Phone Directories Co., Inc. v. 
Henderson, 2000 UT 64, 111410, 8 P.3d 256). 
Accordingly, this .Court concludes that the forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction 
clause in the parties' contract, specifying Utah as the appropriate jurisdiction to resolve 
0 . claims under the contract, creates a rebuttable presumption that the trial court has 
personal jurisdiction over Mr. Brown. See Jacobsen Const. Co., 2005 UT at 11 39 
(holding that "forum selection clauses need not make specific mention of a consent to 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
jurisdiction when the language of the clause makes the parties' intention to resolve 
disputes in a particular forum evident.") See also Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P .2d 717, 726 
(Utah Ct.App.1990) (stating that "defects in personal jurisdiction can be waived" 
(citation omitted)). The Court also finds that the record before it establishes the 
10Explaining: 
In particular, we hold that, while a forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause by itself is 
not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant as a matter of law, such 
clauses do create a presumption in favor of jurisdiction and will be upheld as fair and 
reasonable so long as there is a rational nexus between the forum selected and/or 
consented to, and either the parties to the contract or the transactions that are the subject 
matter of the contract. Although the rational nexus element does require some connection 
betw~en Utah and either the parties to or the actions contemplated by the contract, it 
need not rise to the level required under section [78B-3-205). 
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necessary rational nexus 11: (1) At the time of contracting, Plaintiff, Majestic was a Utah 
corporation, with its business headquarters in Salt Lake County, (Cornpl. ,r 2); (2) At the 
time of contracting, Defendant, Mr. Brown was a resident of Salt Lake County, Id. at 11 
3; (3) Defendant, Sentry is a Utah corporation, ~ith its business headquarters in Salt 
Lake County, Id. at 114; (4) Defendant, SFC is a Utah corporation, with its business 
headquarters in Salt Lake County, Id. at ,r 5; and, (5) In or about March 1995, Majestic 
() 
was in default on the terms of agreement it had with Sentry, both Utah corporations. Id. u 
at 1119. 
In regards to Section 78-12-35, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have misconstrued 
the statutory language and therefore, the purpose of the provision. 
First, Section 78-12-35, specifically addresses the tolling of time for the 
commencement of an action: It clearly states: 
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the 
state, the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this 
chapter after his return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues ~e 
departs from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time 
limited for the commencement of the action. 
(2007)(emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court explained "that the objective of ... 
[78-12-35] was to prevent a defendant from depriving a plaintiff of the opportunity of 
suing him by absenting himself from the state during the period of limitation." Snyder v. 
Clune, 390 P.2d 915, 916 (Utah 1964). Highlighting the purpose of the statute at issue, 
in the matter of Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, 158 P.3d 532, the court held that 
11Explaining that the rational nexus "operates ·as a safety valve, providing a mechanism whereby 
Utah courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction when Utah has no real interest in the outcome of a given 
dispute." Id. at 1J 41. 
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because defendant was an out-of-state defendant whom plaintiff was unable to locate 
at the time she attempted to serve her second amended complaint, which then was 
outside of the applicable statute of limitations, the statute of limitations was tolled. Id. at 
,I1l 2-7 (holding "section 78-12-35 ... does toll the applicable statute of limitations 
when a person against whom a claim has accrued has left the state of Utah and has no 
agent within the state upon whom service of process can be made, even where the 
0 person was at all times amenable to service pursuant to Utah's long-arm statute." 
(emphasis added)). 
Unlike the matter in Olseth, Plaintiffs knew that "[in] the mid-1990s Mr. Brown 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
relocated his permanent residence ... to Teton County, Wyoming, where he has 
continuously maintained his permanent legal residence and domicile." {Gillett Aff. at ,r 
3). Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on September 29, 2008, (Campi.) and served Mr. 
Brown in Wyoming. (Pis.' Reply 2). Plaintiffs have never claimed that they were unable 
to locate Mr. Brown in order to appropriately serve him or, that Mr. Brown's absence 
from Utah deprived them of their ability to timely commence the entitled matter. 
Compare Olseth, 2007 UT at ,i,i 3-7. Plaintiffs solely argue that they were required to 
serve Mr. Brown in Wyoming and that there was an extended period of time in 
attempting to take Mr. Brown's deposition. (Pis.' Reply at 2-3). The fact that Mr. Brown 
was served in Wyoming and the alleged inconvenience of Plaintiffs in attempting to 
timely depose Mr. Brown does not invoke Section 78-12-35 and therefore, does not toll 
the statute of limitations of Plaintiffs' breach of contract and fraud claims. See Tracey· 
v. Blood, 3 P .2d 263, 266 (Utah 1931) (" Apparently all courts are agreed .. that the 
burden was upon the plaintiff to plead and prove facts sufficient to toll the statute of 
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limitations[.)")). 
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs' Rule 59(b) and 60(b) Motion is DENIED. 
2 Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendants' Prepared Judgment 
The Court finds that Defendants' propose;d Order- submitted March 19, 2014, 
and entered by this Court on April 13, 2014, as the Order of the Court - is consistent 
with the Court's ruling on December 16, 2013. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs' "objections" are merely a veiled attempt to take a second 
bite at the apple and are therefore, OVERRULED. 
Accordingly, the Order entered April 13, 2014, is HEREBY AFFIRMED. 
This Ruling stands as the Order of the Court. No further order is required. 
Dated this 24th day of June, 2014. 
BY THE COURT: 
10 
ATTACHMENT 2 
.Page 10 of 11 pages 
C 
0 
0 
u 
0 
0 
0 
o/ 
:0 r.,' 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling dated this :JS' 
day of June, 2014, was issued via.either electronic or standard mail to the following: 
Christopher M. Ault 
Zachary W. Powell 
THE AULT FIRM, PC 
8817 South Redwood Road, Suite A 
West Jordan, UT 84088' 
Stephen G. Homer 
2877 West 9150 South 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
CLERK OF COURT 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID K GILLETT vs. BOYD J BROWN 
CASE NUMBER 030919.800 Miscellaneous 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
KATE TOOMEY 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff - DAVID K GILLETT 
Represented by: STEPHEN G HOMER 
Plaintiff - MAJESTIC AIRLINES INC 
Represented by: STEPHEN G HOMER 
Defendant - BOYD J BROWN 
Represented by: MICHAEL W WRIGHT 
Defendant - SENTRY FINANCIAL CORP 
Represented by: MICHAEL W WRIGHT 
Defendant - SFC AIRCRAFT CORP I 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Balance: 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT -
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amouirt Credit: 
Balance: 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: JURY DEMAND 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
237.50 
237.50 
0.00 
0.00 
NO AMT s 
155.00 
155.00 
0.00 
0.00 
- CIVIL 
75.00 
75.00 
0.00 
0.00 
7.50 
7.50 
0.00 
0.00 
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·/ f/ CASE NUMBER 03 0919800 Miscellaneous 
CASE NOTE 
PROCEEDINGS 
09-05-03 Filed: Complaint No Amount 
09-05-03 Filed: Demand Civil Jury 
09-05-03 Case filed 
09-05-03 Judge J DENNIS FREDERICK assigned. 
09-05-03 Fee Account created Total Due: 
09-05-03 Fee Account created Total Due: 
09-05-03 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S Payment Received: 
155.00 
75.00 
155.00 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S; Code 
Description: JURY DEMAND - CIVIL 
09-05-03 JURY DEMAND - CIVIL Payment Received: 
10-14-03 Filed: Answer (Boyd J. Brown) 
BOYD J BROWN 
12-01-03 Filed: Answer (Sentry Financial Corporation)-
SENTRY FINANCIAL CORP 
75.00 
----••••••-• _, __ _. -- -•-· - --•----•••-•••-- •--•- "• •-•• --•- ••• ••••> •• •• -• ·••••-• - P-•••-•• -•-~-----•••••••~-••• - --•--••-•- •--••-•-•-••--- -•---• •• ----•--••••---
05-05-06 Notice - NOTICE for Case 030919800 ID 6616458 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE is scheduled. 
Date: 06/14/2006 
Time: o 8: 3 O a. m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - N41 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: J DENNIS FREDERICK 
On its own motion, the Court orders the parties to appear on said 
date and time and show cause why this case should not be dismissed 
for failure to-prosecute. By failing to appear, the Court will 
enter an order of dismissal without further notice. 
05-05-06 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE scheduled on June 14, 2006 at 08:30 AM in 
FOURTH FLOOR-N41 with Judge FREDERICK. 
06-14-06 Notice - Order of Dismissal for Case 030919800 
Based on the failure of the parties and/or counsel to respond to 
the Order to Show Cause, the Court orders this case be dismissed 
without prejudice. 
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17 /488 NUMBER 030919800 Miscellaneous 
0 06-14-06 Case Disposition is Dismsd w/o prejudice 
Disposition Judge is J DENNIS FREDERICK 
.. 04-13-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 7.50 
04-13-07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 7.50 
0 
Note: 10.00 cash tendered. 2.50 change given. 
04-28-07 Judge KATE TOOMEY assigned. 
0 
0 
Q 
0 
Q 
() 
0 
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3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MAJESTIC AIRLINES INC vs. SFC AIRCRAFT CORP I 
CASE NUMBER 070409723 Debt Collection 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
BRUCE LUBECK 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff - DAVID K GILLETT 
Represented by: STEPHEN G HOMER 
Plaintiff - MAJESTIC AIRLINES INC 
Represented by: STEPHEN G HOMER 
Defendant - BOYD J BROWN 
Defendant - SENTRYN FINANCIAL CORP 
Represented by: MICHAEL W WRIGHT 
Defendant - SFC AIRCRAFT CORP I 
-0-- ACCOUNT-· SUMMARY--------··-··--
0 
0 
0 
CASE NOTE 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Balance: 
230.00 
230.00 
0.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
155.00 
155.00 
0.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: JURY DEMAND - CIVIL 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
75.00 
75.00 
0.00 
0.00 
PROCEEDINGS 
0 06-13-07 Case filed 
06-13-07 Judge ROYAL I HANSEN assigned. 
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070409723 Debt Collection 
06-13-07 Filed: Complaint No Amount 
06-13-07 Filed: Demand Civil Jury 
06-13-07 Fee Account created 
06-13-07 Fee Account created 
06-13-07 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S 
Total Due: 
Total Due: 
Payment Received: 
155.00 
75.00 
155.00 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S, JURY DEMAND 
- CIVIL 
06-13-07 JURY DEMAND - CIVIL Payment Received: 75.00 
10-23-07 Notice - Order of Dismissal for Case 070409723 
Based on a review of this file and Rule 4(b) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Court orders this case be dismissed, without 
prejudice, for failure to serve the defendant within 120 days of 
filing the Complaint. 
10-23-07 Case Disposition is Dismissed 
Disposition Judge is ROYAL I HANSEN 
10-25-07 Note: Archived Physical File BOX042508(2) 
11-02-07 Filed: Notice of Appearance of Counsel 
09-09-09 Note: Archived Physical File BOX090910(4) 
--- ------------~-·------- ----- ··-- ·----···-··---- -------------------- --------~-------···--•-'••·· ..... - ------------------------------ ---· ----·------------·-----· -----
01-27-10 Judge KEITH KELLY assigned. 
05-04-10 Judge BRUCE LUBECK assigned. 
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